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Abstract 
There is an identified need for mid-level systems for monitoring a large number of subsea wells. 
To meet this demand Statoil is looking into developing a software program for such monitoring. 
As a step in this process, this thesis is looking into development of key condition indicators to 
be used in such a program for the Statoil operated Gullfaks Satellites tied back to Gullfaks C 
(GFCSAT). The indicators developed in this thesis are aimed at contributing to a good and 
efficient mid-level monitoring of technical integrity and availability for the GFCSAT subsea 
production system.  
 
The first step in the development process has been to establish the goals and objectives that 
will be the pillars for the indicators. These goals are based on the same goals that are used to 
govern the operations of the GFCSAT; the three chosen goals are within the areas health, 
safety and environment, operational costs and production. For each of these three goals 
relevant reports of past events were retrieved from GFCSAT historical records. The reports 
were categorized into 11 categories based primarily on common failure modes. Categories 
without indicator detectable failure modes were discarded after the analysis process leaving 8 
categories for further analysis. For the indicator detectable failure modes possible indicators 
were suggested and reviewed using a checklist approach. Based on this review, one indicator 
was selected for each of the 8 categories. The 8 selected category indicators were in turn 
compared based on the number and severity of reports, trends and coverage of the failure 
modes within the respective category. 
Based on this the key condition indicators are found to be the indicators within the categories 
communication, hydraulics, sensors, downhole gauges and multiphase meter. The hydraulics-
indicator is a system indicator aimed at detecting leaks. The other four indicators are well 
specific and are all aimed at detecting the failure modes no signal and out of range signal for 
the equipment within the respective categories.    
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1. Introduction 
The petroleum industry has continuously developed new technologies to develop new fields. 
This development has led the industry from land into shallow water and further into deeper and 
deeper water. An important enabling factor for this development has been subsea technology. 
It started with simple X-mas Tree (XT) systems and is now developing towards subsea plants 
with processing and compression. Today more than 30 years after the first subsea XTs were 
installed about 800 subsea XTs are installed on the Norwegian continental shelf alone (DNV 
GL, 2014). The systems currently in operation represent many generations of development. 
This is particularly evident in the control systems. Where the older XTs have only the most 
vital sensors, the new systems have a large number of sensors for conditional monitoring (DNV 
GL, 2014). An important part of this development is software solutions for monitoring all 
parameters important for monitoring the condition. While the development in conditional 
monitoring is moving towards monitoring details such as the power consumption of solenoid 
valves there is a shortage of mid-level systems that can monitor key condition parameters for a 
large number of wells (Rotter, 2014).  
 
To meet this demand, Statoil is looking into developing a mid-level software program for 
conditional monitoring and operational management (Rotter, 2014). As a step in this process, 
this thesis aims to identify key condition indicators for such a program for the Statoil operated 
Gullfaks Satellites tied back to Gullfaks C.   
 
1.1. Scope and objective 
The objective of this thesis is to develop key condition indicators for the Gullfaks Satellite wells 
tied back to Gullfaks C. These indicators may be included in a prototype of a mid-level 
conditional monitoring and operational management program for Statoil.  
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1.2. Limitations 
The indicators are to be developed for the  L, M and N-template of the Gullfaks Satellite fields. 
These templates are tied back to Gullfaks C and will hereafter be referred to as “GFCSAT”. 
The thesis is limited to considering these wells with associated systems.  
 
The objective is limited to consider indicators that can be developed with the sensors and 
systems currently in place, i.e. only sensor signals available from onshore computers. 
Therefore, it is not considered part of the scope to suggest changes such as adding sensors, 
improvements to the control system or the signal infrastructure. It is therefore a requirement 
that the indicators are based on sensor signals that are currently available from excel on onshore 
Statoil computers. 
 
1.3. Methodology 
The purpose of this section is to show the method used in this thesis for development of key 
condition indicators for the GFCSAT subsea production system.  
The methodology used in this thesis consist of the following steps: 
 Establish goals 
 Acquire available relevant data for achieving each goal 
 Analyze and systemize the data 
 Combine the data and divide into categories based on common features 
 Identify common and critical failure modes that need to be detached 
 Review external sources to verify the analyzed data 
 Find the indicator that has the best coverage of failure modes within each category 
 Select the key indicators that provide the best overall condition monitoring  
By applying these steps, the final few key condition indicators shall cover the most important 
parameters for mid-level conditional monitoring.  
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1.4. Structure of the report 
The report is structured as follows: 
 
Chapter 1 contains the introduction of the thesis with scope and objective. The objective and 
the rational behind it are demonstrated. The chapter also contains a brief explanation of the 
methodology used for reaching the objective.  
 
Chapter 2 presents the organization Statoil and the Gullfaks Satellite wells tied back to Gullfaks 
C. The chapter further contains a detailed description of the most relevant equipment which the 
indicators are to be developed for.  
 
Next, Chapter 3 presents the goals and objectives that currently applies to the subsea production 
systems. These are reviewed in order to establish goals to be achieved by the indicators. 
 
In Chapter 4, an analysis of incident reports, malfunction reports and PE-loss reports are 
reviewed in order to find common failure modes. 
 
In chapter 5, the failure modes are developed into key condition indicators, that in turn are 
tested based on indication rate of failure modes.  
 
Chapter 6 contains the discussion of the work performed and results achieved.  
 
Chapter 7 contains the conclusion of the thesis. 
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2. Field and equipment description  
This chapter presents the relevant background information for the thesis, including Gullfaks 
Satellite fields, the organization operating it, and the installed equipment and control systems it 
consists of. The presentation will focus on the wells tied back to Gullfaks C, referred to as 
GFCSAT. An overview of GFCSAT is given in figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Overview of GFCSAT (FMC Technologies, 2008). 
2.1. Field description 
The satellite fields Gullfaks South, Skinfaks, Rimfaks and Gullveig in block 34/10 and 33/10 
have been developed with subsea solutions. These fields, known as the Gullfaks Satelittes, are 
all tied back to Gullfaks A or Gullfaks C on the Gullfaks main field (Statoil, 2015A) (Statoil, 
2015B).  
The first phase of the development, Gullfaks Satellites phase 1, covers the installation of 8 
subsea templates (template D-K). The first well delivered by this project came on stream in 
1998. It was followed by the second phase, Gullfaks Satellites phase 2, covering installation of 
2 templates (template L and M) tied back to Gullfaks C. Production from these wells started in 
2001 (Knudsen, Tor W.; Sølvik, Nils A., 2011). 
The last of the development projects is the Skinfaks/Rimfaks Increased oil Recovery Project 
(SRI). This project was an extension of the Gullfaks Satellites phase 2 project and installed one 
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tie-in manifold, one additional template (template N) and a satellite well (N5) (Knudsen, Tor 
W.; Sølvik, Nils A., 2011). The first SRI-well came on stream in 2007 (Statoil, 2015C).  
Two new development projects for Gullfaks Satellites are ongoing, one for installation of a 
subsea wet gas compressor and one for two additional templates (Knudsen, Tor W.; Sølvik, 
Nils A., 2011) (Norwegian Petroleum, 2015). 
2.2. Organization 
The operator of the Gullfaks field and the GFCSAT-templates is the international energy 
company Statoil (Statoil, 2015A). Statoil has approximately 23 000 employees and operates in 
36 countries. The company’s headquarters and majority of operations is located in Norway, 
where the company currently operates 48 fields (Statoil, 2015D). Statoil has a complex 
organizational structure that is divided into multiple levels. The main department of interest in 
this thesis is the subsea operations department “Asset Bergen” that is responsible for the 
technical integrity and availability of the GFCSAT subsea production system (Statoil, 2015E). 
This department is part of the Subsea division. The operation of the GFCSAT also involves 
several other departments, of which the well integrity department, IMR department, the 
production technology department and the Gullfaks C organization both onshore and offshore 
are of most importance (Rotter, 2014). In the following section, a brief presentation of these 
departments will be given, focusing on tasks that are of importance for GFCSAT and the 
interface with the subsea operations department.  
 
Figure 2: Simplified organizational chart, based on Statoil (2015E).  
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Subsea operations department 
The subsea operations department is responsible for the technical integrity and availability of 
the subsea production systems on GFCSAT. As a part of this responsibility, the department 
provides operational and technical support. All maintenance activities on the subsea systems 
both preventive and corrective are initiated and followed up by the department (Statoil, 2015E). 
 
Well integrity department 
The well integrity department is responsible for the technical integrity of the well, including the 
XT. This department provides operational and technical support (Statoil, 2015F), much like the 
subsea department.  
 
Inspection, maintenance and repair department 
The inspection, maintenance and repair department (IMR) is responsible for conducting all 
interventions on the subsea production system, with the exception of well related interventions. 
This department is part of the subsea division.  In most cases the subsea operations department 
will initiate the intervention and the IMR-department will physically perform the operation. 
(Statoil, 2015E) 
 
Petroleum technology department 
The petroleum technology department’s responsibilities are reservoir and well management. 
The department covers the disciplines geology, reservoir technology and production 
technology. Its main responsibility is to manage the reservoir efficiently, in order to ensure that 
as much as possible of the resources in place are produced. (Statoil, 2015E) 
 
Offshore organization  
Gullfaks C has an offshore organization that carries out the day-to-day operations of the 
installation, including all satellite wells. The operation of the satellite wells is primarily 
conducted by the central control room (CCR) operators. (Statoil, 2011) 
 
Operations group  
There is an operations group for each installation. This group is the main point of contact, whose  
main tasks are to plan, prepare and facilitate operations conducted on or for the installation. 
(Statoil, 2015E) 
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2.3. The Gullfaks subsea operational philosophy   
The subsea production systems on GFCSAT have a design lifespan of 20 years. For operations 
within the defined lifespan the philosophy is primarily focused on operating the subsea 
production system in a cost efficient way that at the same time ensures integrity and production 
(Statoil, 2011). The philosophy covers the areas monitoring, inspection, maintenance and 
repair, which will be introduced in the following sections. 
 
Monitoring 
The control room operators on the host platform Gullfaks C conduct the daily operations and 
monitoring of the subsea facilities. To assist in operations, the control systems’ predefined 
alarms are automatically activated if the sensor readings indicate abnormal values. There is also 
a system for automatic shutdown should the sensor readings indicate potentially dangerous 
situations like leaks or process values approaching the operational or design limits. (Statoil, 
2011) 
 
Inspection 
The planned inspection activities for the GFCSAT subsea production system are conducted 
according to a plan that is to be prepared each year. The inspection is designed to uncover the 
general condition of the subsea production system with focus on detecting leaks, mechanical 
damages and assessing the condition of the anode protection systems.  All damages are 
registered. The further measures taken depend on the seriousness of the condition, ranging from 
immediate action to further inspection for tracking development. In addition to the planned 
inspection activities, the subsea department can mobilize additional inspections should 
irregularities or abnormal situations call for it. (Statoil, 2011) 
  
Maintenance   
Some components have shorter lifespan than the 20 years, and faults and damages can occur. 
To best account for this, different maintenance activities are conducted for the different 
components. Preventive maintenance activities on the subsea production system is mainly 
limited to testing the integrity of the barriers, i.e. mostly testing of internal leak rate of valves. 
The corrective maintenance activities are divided into planned and unplanned corrective 
maintenance. The planned corrective maintenance relates to replacement of retrievable modules 
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that contain components with a shorter lifespan than the system design life of 20 years. (Statoil, 
2011) 
Examples of such components are the choke valve and the subsea electronics modules. For the 
choke valves, it is important to know the condition in order to plan a replacement of the FCM-
module before the choke valve is worn out. For the SEM, redundancy ensure that production 
can continue even if one unit fails. There are usually large variations in time from one failure 
to the next. These two factors make planned maintenance in defined time intervals less 
economically than planned corrective maintenance. If failures occur in other components than 
the ones pre-defined to be replaced or fixed according to the planned corrective maintenance 
program, this is defined as unplanned corrective maintenance. For the planned maintenance 
condition monitoring, redundancy and replacement modules should ensure continuous 
production until replacement could be conducted. For unplanned corrective maintenance this 
may not be the case. (Statoil, 2011) 
 
Repair 
All interventions, including inspections, are conducted by the IMR department and are 
preferably conducted as planned campaigns. The planned campaigns are typically initiated 
when there is a sufficient number of needed repairs and replacements of the planned corrective 
maintenance type. The planned campaigns help minimize the time spent and costs related to 
maintenance. They are also preferably conducted simultaneously with other production 
reducing activities topside, such as turnaround or compressor maintenance, to reduce lost 
production.   
If immediate repair is needed the IMR department has to prioritize the intervention up against 
other interventions. If the repair is not HSE-related it will normally be prioritized by which 
intervention gives or saves the most production.  (Statoil, 2011) 
There will also be some interventions where a needed immediate repair initiates a campaign, 
and other planned repair, replacements or inspections are conducted by the same vessel when 
it is on site (Rotter, 2014).  
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2.4. Equipment 
The templates installed in Gullfaks satellites projects phase 1, 2 and the SRI project are all 
based on the FMC hinge-over template solution (HOST) (Knudsen, Tor W.; Sølvik, Nils A., 
2011). There are few differences between the equipment installed in GFSAT 1 and 2 (Knudsen, 
Tor W., 1999). For the SRI-project the difference is more extensive. In this presentation, the 
GFSAT 2-consept is described and the differences to the SRI project are described where it is 
of importance.  
The basic concept for HOST-templates was to minimize foundation of the template by folding 
in wing element to allow for installation through the moonpool of a drilling rig. The rough 
weather and seabed conditions proved the initial installation method to be difficult and time 
consuming. The concept was therefore changed to larger foundations installed by vessel in the 
GFSAT 2 and SRI projects. (Knudsen, Tor W., 1999) (FMC Technologies B, 2006) 
The HOST-configuration used L and M templates have four wing elements for well slots, two 
and two on opposing sides and triple porches for two flowline and one umbilical connection 
elements on to two other sides, as shown on figure 2. This configuration allow for a daisy-chain 
configuration of the templates. The N-template is similar but with an additional flowline 
connection on both sides. (FMC Technologies B, 2006)  
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Figure 3: Manifold module with foundation, retrieved from (FMC Technologies B, 2006, s. 15).  
2.4.1. Manifold module 
The central element of the template is the manifold module, placed on top of the center section, 
shown in figure 3. The main function is to provide a connection from the flow control module 
(FCM) for each individual well to one or more manifolds for commingling the different 
wellflows and connecting it to the seabed flowlines. The manifold modules on the L and M-
templates have connections for four wells and two flowlines. The M-template also holds a 
HIPPS-module, to protect the manifold from initial high well pressure in the M-2 well (FMC 
Kongsberg Subsea, 2001A). As there is no longer need for the system it as be permanently 
taken out of operation (Rotter, 2014). 
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On the N-template the center hub was enlarged to accommodate the complex manifold module. 
The module holds two production headers, one gas lift header and connection for the satellite 
well. To provide connections for all the headers the N-template has quadruple porches (FMC 
Technologies B, 2006). 
Another important function of the manifold module is to connect the utility lines, electric- and 
signal cables in the umbilical to the individual wells. The module holds manifolds for 
distribution of chemical, hydraulics and service lines (annulus bleed) to the FCM of each well. 
The lines are connected to the FCM through the same connector that connects the wellflow. 
Electrical and signal cables are connected to each well though jumpers. (FMC Technologies B, 
2006) 
2.4.2. Protective structure  
A protective structure is placed directly on top of the template to protect the equipment from 
dropped objects and fishing gear. The roof of the protective structure is made of several hatches 
allowing operations that require access to the template equipment and at the same time 
providing maximum protection for the rest of the equipment. The structure should also allow 
for ROV inspection and operations without opening the roof hatches. (FMC Kongsberg Subsea, 
2001B) 
2.4.3. Tubing hanger and X-mas tree 
The GFCSAT well uses 18 ¾” wellhead connected to horizontal X-mas tree (FMC Kongsberg 
Subsea, 2001A). Inside the XT 7” tubing and tubing hanger are installed. The tubing hanger 
has side connection to the production bore of the XT and wireline retrievable plugs act as 
barriers in the top section.  The tubing hanger also holds several electrical and hydraulic 
connections for downhole equipment, such as the surface controlled subsurface safety valve 
(SCSSV) and down hole pressure and temperature gauges (DHPT). Since there were plans early 
on for intelligent completions the tubing hanger in all GFCSAT-wells have additional 
connections for intelligent completion. (Knudsen, Tor W., 1999) (FMC Technologies B, 2006) 
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Figure 4: FCM, SCM, Horizontal XT, and Tubing Hanger. Retrieved from (Statoil, 2001) 
In the tubing hanger the production fluid is diverted 90 degrees into the production bore of the 
XT. The production bore has two 5 1/8” gate valves, the production master and wing valves 
that make up the barriers. Between the two valves there are ports with associated valves for 
injection of MEG, scale inhibitor, wax inhibitor in addition to a crossover line connection to 
the annulus bleed system. On the opposite side there is an annulus bore with an annulus master 
valve for connection to the production annulus, and a workover valve for connection to the 
sealed compartment above the tree cap. These two bores connect to the crossover line upsteam 
of the annulus wing valve that again connects to the annulus bleed system (FMC Technologies 
B, 2006). As the name implies the primary function of the system is to bleed down excess 
pressure in the annulus, but the system is also used for service and maintenance operations 
(Rotter, 2014). 
The XT is made of three valve blocks, where the tubing hanger is positioned inside the main 
central block. This block also contains the workover valve, production master valve and annulus 
master valves. On opposing sides the production and annulus wing blocks are bolted on. The 
annulus wing block contains the annulus wing valve and dual pressure transmitters. The 
production wing block contains the production wing valve, temperature and pressure 
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transmitters in addition to all other valves for chemical injection and crossover lines. All lines 
are connected to the XT wing hub that in turn connects to the manifold module via the flow 
control module. (FMC Kongsberg Subsea, 2001A) 
The XT’s used in the SRI-project are somewhat different.  The most significant differences are 
caused by the gas lift system that uses the production annulus. The annulus wing block has an 
additional 2” connection with associated valves and flowloop for connection to the gas lift 
system via the XT-wing hub. (FMC Technologies, 2008)  
The XT has several connection points. The XT wing hub connect all fluid lines from the 
production line to the hydraulics to the flow control module. The subsea control module (SCM) 
mounting base provide connection to the SCM that controls and monitors all XT and FCM 
functions. All valves also have the possibility for ROV override from the side mounted ROV 
panel. The MQC plate is an integrated part of the ROV-panel, this is used for ROV-operations 
during installation or retrieval of the XT. (FMC Technologies B, 2006) (FMC Kongsberg 
Subsea, 2001B)  
All the XT components are fitted within a rigid frame structure for protection. The frame holds 
four guide funnels, four pillars and anodes. The guide funnels used for guiding the XT in place 
on top of the PGB during installation.  The four pillars are used to support and lock the FCM 
in place. (FMC Technologies B, 2006)  
2.4.4. Flow Control Module 
The FCM connects the XT-wing hub to a similar manifold wing hub on the manifold module. 
Two 12” downward facing connectors that lock on to the wing hubs provide the connections. 
The FCM has a 6” flowloop for controlling and measuring the wellsteam passing through. 
Within the flowloop is a hydraulically-operated choke valve, temperature and pressure 
transmitters both up- and downstream, and sand detectors. The choke valve can be mechanically 
operated from the side mounted ROV-panel. The FCM equipment is mounted to a protective 
frame that forms a protective roof over the XT (Knudsen, Tor W., 1999).  Mounted to the roof 
structure is a hydrocarbon leak detector for detecting leaks from the XT.  The FCM can be 
installed and retrieved as a part of the XT or independently by a FCM running tool. The SCM 
on the XT controls the choke through hydraulic lines incorporated in the XT-connector. Choke 
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position and sensor signals are connected to the SCM via ROV-operated electrical conductive 
connectors. (FMC Kongsberg Subsea, 2001A) 
The FCMs on the SRI project are similar but with more equipment. The most significant 
differences are a multiphase flow meter for measuring the wellstream and a 2”flowloop with 
choke and instrumentation for controlling the gas lift. (FMC Technologies, 2008) 
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2.5. Production control system  
The production control system as a topside and a subsea part as illustrated in figure 5. This 
illustration and the following text in this chapter is based on the L and M-templates. There are 
certain differences to the N-template, but these are not of significant importance for this thesis 
and are therefore not described in detail. 
 
Figure 5: Simplified overview of control system based on (Statoil, 2001). 
The signals from the SCU are also available for onshore computers. These signals are accessed 
by excel for development of the indicators.  
2.5.1. Top side equipment 
The major parts of the topside production control system are the Subsea Control Unit (SCU), 
Subsea Power and Communication Unit (SPCU), Uninterruptable power supply units (UPS), 
Hydraulic Power Unit (HPU) and the Hydraulic Test Panel (HTP). (FMC Kongsberg Subsea, 
2001A) 
The SCU is a single cabinet containing a computer system that monitors and controls the other 
parts of the production control system. The SCU also interfaces with the OS in the CCR and 
with the process and emergency shutdown systems. Sensor signals are collected in the SCU for 
monitoring the operational state of all the related systems both topside and subsea. The data is 
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relayed to the OS that displays the system status to the operator. If any action is needed the 
commands are sent from the OS via the SCU to the correct component. (FMC Kongsberg 
Subsea, 2001A) 
Signals from the SCU to all the SCMs and back, are sent via the SPCU. The SPCU is a cabinet 
containing dual electric power systems, filters and modems. The two identical power systems 
both have sufficient capacity to supply power to all the SCMs via the umbilicals. The filters 
and modems enable transmitting the signals to the SCMs via the same cables that supply the 
electrical power. (FMC Kongsberg Subsea, 2001A) 
The electric power for the SPCU is supplied from the platforms system via dual UPS units to 
ensure uninterrupted supply for at least 30 minutes after platform supply fails. (FMC Kongsberg 
Subsea, 2001A) 
The hydraulic power for the subsea facilities are generated in a HPU topside and distributed by 
umbilicals. The HPU is composed of reservoirs, pumps and accumulators capable of providing 
a continuous supply of high-pressure (HP) and low-pressure (LP) hydraulics. One line of HP 
and one of LP hydraulics are supplied to each of the two hydraulic test panels. (FMC Kongsberg 
Subsea, 2001A) 
The hydraulic test panels provide connection and testing facilities for all hydraulic and most of 
the utility lines in the umbilicals. The utility lines are; MEG, scale inhibitor, wax inhibitor, 
emulsion breaker supply, and the annulus bleed lines. Each of the two test panels supplies one 
of the two umbilicals. (FMC Kongsberg Subsea, 2001A) 
2.5.2. Subsea Control Module 
The main component subsea is the electro-hydraulic subsea control module (SCM) that is 
connected to the SCM mounting base on each XT. The topside production control system 
communicates with the SCM through electrical cables in the umbilical. Commands for 
operation of all valves from the SCSSV to the branch valves on the manifold module are 
processed and effectuated by the control and hydraulics system in the SCM (FMC Technologies 
B, 2006). Similarly, all sensor signals are collected and sent back to the topside production 
control system. (Knudsen, Tor W., 1999) 
17 
 
Seen from the outside the SCM consists of a protective canister with a hydraulic accumulator 
and a hydraulic compensator mounted to the side. The bottom of the canister has 3 wire 
conductive connectors and a total of 27 hydraulic couplers connecting to the SCM mounting 
base. The top has an additional 5 wire conductive ROV connectors. The SCM also holds locking 
mechanisms for locking or unlocking it from the mounting base. Should any failure occur the 
SCM can be retrieved and reinstalled by ROV and a Module Running Tool. (FMC 
Technologies, 2007) 
All the finer electric and hydraulic equipment are mounted inside the pressure compensated and 
silicon-oil filled canister. Electrical power supply and communication is provided by two 
electric cables connected to the top connectors. Each cable is independent of the other and 
connected to an independent power supply, modem and subsea electronic module (SEM) (FMC 
Technologies, 2007). The commands processed in the SEMs are effectuated by two valve 
solenoids that in turn control one hydraulic directional valve that supplies a valve actuator on 
the XT, FCM or manifold module with hydraulic power. The system is made with dual 
components that make up two independent systems from cable via SEM to solenoid. Only one 
system can be active at the time. (FMC Kongsberg Subsea, 2001B) 
The hydraulic system is divided into a HP- and a LP part. Both parts have two independent 
supply lines with individual filter elements, and a directional valve to connect one of them to 
the supply manifold. The LP-supply manifold supplies 14 different valve actuators, while the 
HP-manifold only supplies the SCSSV and two lines for other downhole functions, if installed. 
To ensure a sufficient supply without large pressure changes an accumulator is connected to 
each of the supply manifolds. (FMC Technologies, 2007) 
The return hydraulic fluid is collected in a HP and a LP return manifold and expelled into the 
sea through check valves. A compensator is installed on the LP-return line to prevent possible 
vacuum during bleed down. (FMC Technologies, 2007) 
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3. Goals and objectives 
In this chapter, established national and company specific requirements and strategies are 
reviewed in order to establish the goals for the development of indicators. 
 
How the operator of a subsea field chooses to operate varies from field to field. The operator or 
partnership usually have a set of goals that govern the operation. Some overall goals are 
common to most operators and easily comprehensible, for example to limit or minimize cost 
and maximize production. Other goals may also be present and the set of goals can change over 
time. These goals are relayed to more specific goals and objectives for each of the divisions and 
departments involved in the operations.   
The location of the subsea field can influence the operations. Different countries have different 
laws and regulations for the petroleum activity. The influence is usually largest in the 
exploration and development phase but it also affects the production phase (The Norwegian 
Petroleum Act, 2011). It can safely be assumed that formal requirements in laws, regulation 
and standards are covered by the monitoring systems already in place. Therefore, only goals 
and objectives are considered in the development of indicators. 
The goals and objectives that govern the operation form the foundation for the operational 
philosophy for the subsea field. However, the operations are also affected by several other 
factors such as the decisions of the partnership of the licenses, the supply agreements, the host 
platform or facility, the water depth and environmental factors. There are many examples where 
the supply agreements govern the whole operation. One example is the Tamar field offshore 
Israel that supplies power plants that supply large part of the country’s electricity. Only short 
production stops can cause serious problems. Fields of this type may have a need for very high 
reliability and can allow a higher cost to ensure this (Healy et al., 2013).  
The Gullfaks field is a classical oil field located in the northern North Sea on the NCS. The 
operations of this field is governed by the Norwegian legislation, the strategic goals of the 
operator Statoil, the goals and ambitions of the involved divisions and departments in Statoil, 
and the Gullfaks Subsea operational philosophy. The objective of this thesis is to develop 
indicators for a subsea management program for condition monitoring and operational 
management for the GFCSAT subsea production system. These indicators must be based on 
the same legislation, goals, ambitions and philosophy as GFCSAT. In this chapter the 
legislation, goals, ambitions and philosophy is reviewed in order to select these goals. 
19 
 
3.1. Norwegian legislation, country level 
The GFCSAT is located on the NCS, making Norwegian legislation and resource management 
applicable. Norwegian legislation has a large number of laws, decrees and regulations that 
govern the petroleum activities. “ACT 29 November 1996 No.72 relation to petroleum 
activities” known as the petroleum law is perhaps the most important. It covers several topics 
such as licenses, approval of the plan for development and operations (PDO), liability and 
governmental oversight. Chapter 4, covering production section 4.1, starts with “Production of 
petroleum shall take place in such a manner that as much as possible of the petroleum in place 
in each individual petroleum deposit, or in several deposits in combination, will be produced” 
(The Norwegian Petroleum Act, 2011). This quotation outlines the primary goal for production.  
Perhaps the most important regulation concerning health, safety and environment is the 
regulation known as “The framework regulation”. This regulation’s first section contains the 
purpose of the regulation, which is to “promote high standards for health, safety and the 
environment in activities covered by these regulations” and to “achieve systematic 
implementation of measures to comply with requirements and achieve the goals laid down in 
the working environment and safety legislation” (Petroleum Safety Authority Norway, 2015). 
This quote is outlining primary goals such as minimizing environmental impact and keeping a 
high safety level.  
In addition to laws and regulations, a number of standards also apply to the GFCSAT subsea 
production systems. For NCS the NORSOK and ISO standards are the most important ones. 
These standards primarily cover design requirements but also some requirements that relate to 
operations. By the assumption that other systems adhere to the formal requirements, the 
important parts for this thesis are the intentions and objectives of the standards. The NORSOK-
standards objectives are described in the first sentence of the foreword of all NORSOK-
standards; “The NORSOK standards are developed by the Norwegian petroleum industry to 
ensure adequate safety, value adding and cost effectiveness for petroleum industry 
developments and operations” (Norwegian Technology Centre, 2002).  
To sum up, the goals and objectives found in the legislation and standards promote operations 
that maximize production with high standards within health, safety and environment.  
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3.2. Statoil’s strategic goals  
Statoil is the operator of the GFCSAT and as a result of that the operations are governed by the 
strategic goals, procedures and philosophy of Statoil. The company’s strategic goals, values 
and policies are described in the publically available document named «The Statoil Book».  
Statoil’s strategic goals laid down in “The Statoil book” can be summed up by quoting parts of 
the introduction greetings by the former president and CEO Helge Lund  “At Statoil, the way 
we deliver is as important as what we deliver. Safe, secure and efficient operations are our top 
priority. Together, we create value for our owners with integrity” (Statoil, 2013). The strategic 
goals in “The Statoil Book” are further relayed into more specific goals and objectives for the 
individual divisions and departments, as described for the subsea division in the next 
subchapter.  
“The Statoil Book” also describes how the company works to achieve its goals and objectives. 
The company’s strategic goals are relayed and developed into more specific goals that are 
measured by key performance indicators (KPIs). This is done at several levels in the 
organization and down to each department.  
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3.3. Subsea division and department goals and ambitions 
The subsea division in Norway has specified the division’s goals and objectives in a document 
named “Ambitions towards 2016”. The goals relevant for subsea operations are listed in figure 
6.  
 
Figure 6: The subsea division’s ambitions towards 2016 (Statoil, 2015G) 
The subsea operations at the GFCSAT is managed by the subsea operations department in 
Bergen. This department’s strategic objectives and KPIs are therefore most relevant for 
GFCSAT. The strategic objectives and KPIs appear on an internal web page with corresponding 
indicators showing the latest development, as illustrated in table 1. Only the strategic objectives 
and KPIs that are relevant for the operations are listed in table 1 retrieved from (Statoil, 2015H).   
 
Table 1: The table is an illustration of how the strategic objectives and key performance indicators of the 
subsea operations department appear on the internal web page. The arrows to the right side should indicate 
the latest development of the KPIs, the arrows 
 
  
Strategic objectives 
No harm to people the environment and assets. Serious HSE incidents:          
Ensure technical integrity and barriers for Subsea fields. Number of serious spills:        
Reliable subsea facilities. PE loss contribution:
KPI
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3.4. Goals and objectives for developing indicators  
The objective of this thesis is to develop indicators for a subsea management program that 
should help the subsea operations department in condition monitoring and operational 
management. To develop these indicators, they must be based on the same goals that govern 
the operations and subsea operations department. For the subsea operations department 
managing the GFCSAT production system there are several set of goals as shown in the 
previous parts of this chapter.  Using multiple levels of goals would complicate the 
development. To simplify only one goal within each of the areas safety, production and cost are 
used to develop indicators. These three areas reflect the areas the subsea division uses for their 
ambitions, shown in figure 6.  
For health, safety and environment, there are goals on each level; from legislation that has the 
purpose to “promote high standards for health, safety and environment…” to the subsea 
operations department’s strategic goals “No harm to people, the environment and asset”. All 
the goals can be shortened to the ambition of minimizing the number of accidents, and thereby 
high safety levels and minimized environmental impact. For a subsea production system, there 
are few scenarios where a serious accident does not involve leaks. To achieve no leaks integrity 
is the key, as the subsea divisions goal “Ensure technical integrity on subsea facilities” 
emphasize.  To cover the ambitions in the goals in all levels and to emphasize the most likely 
scenarios the goal “no serious incidents, including leaks” have been chose to cover the HSE 
area. This goal is well suited to cover the subsea departments two HSE related KPI’s, “serious 
HSE-incidents” and “number of serious spills”.    
For an oilfield in operation the important cost is the operational expense or OPEX. OPEX is all 
costs related to production and maintenance operations. Simple economic theory indicates that 
when the OPEX-costs exceed the income the field is decommissioned. This illustrates the 
importance of limiting or minimizing OPEX-costs, especially for mature oilfields. In the 
legislation and Statoil’s strategic goals listed previously in this chapter, only formulations like 
“value added”, “creating value” and “cost effectiveness” are mentioned. The subsea division 
has the very specific ambition “Yearly OPEX cost pr. subsea well below 2,5 million NOK”. To 
keep the goals simple the goal “minimize OPEX-cost” is selected in the cost area.  
For the production area the “petroleum law” states that the goal is simply to produce as much 
as possible of the resources that are in place. This is an overall goal that depends on several 
different disciplines and factors. In the daily operations ensuring high production efficiency 
(shortened to “PE”) is the most important goal for ensuring this. For the subsea department PE 
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is primarily about minimizing subsea related PE-losses. This is emphasized in both the subsea 
divisions ambition “PE total subsea losses below 1%” and the subsea operation department KPI 
“PE loss contribution”. To summarize the goals in the production area the goal “minimize 
subsea related PE-losses” is chosen as one of the goals. 
To summarize, the indicators will be governed by the following three goals: 
 No serious incidents, including leaks 
 Minimize OPEX-cost 
 Minimize subsea related PE-losses 
 
These three goals are to govern the development of the indicators. These goals should reflect 
the subsea operations’ goals, and therefore indicators developed according to these goals should 
be well suited to help the subsea operations department achieve their goals. 
  
24 
 
4. Analysis  
In the previous chapter the goals that make the foundation for the indicators to be developed, 
were reviewed. The following three goals were selected as pillars for these indicators:  
 No serious incidents, including leaks 
 Minimize OPEX-cost 
 Minimize subsea related PE-losses 
 
To achieve these three goals a thorough analysis of data for each goal has to be conducted. The 
purpose of the analysis is to find the most common and critical failures that cause HSE-
incidents, avoidable OPEX-costs and PE-losses in order to find the failure modes that need to 
be indicated to detect these failures. In order to find critical failure modes and failure 
mechanisms, historical records for the GFCSAT subsea production system have been analyzed. 
For more details about the initial systematization and analyzation process see Appendix A.  
 
Production at the GFCSAT-wells started in 2001 and 2007, making the records date back 14 
and 8 years respectively (Knudsen, Tor W.; Sølvik, Nils A., 2011). Since the subsea production 
systems have not been changed much the historical data should be a good prediction for future 
events (Rotter, 2014). Identifiable trends are analyzed to add predictive value. For example, 
some system weaknesses can have caused many problems in the early years and may be less 
relevant now, while other failure mechanisms may come as a result of wear and tear over the 
years and can be more relevant for predicting future events.  
 
To complement the analysis of historical data external sources of similar information will be 
reviewed. This is a useful way to tell if the findings are similar to earlier studies and to find 
possible new or overlooked critical or common failures. If the findings in the other sources 
differ significantly from the GFCSAT-data the reason must be found. If a failure is significantly 
more common in the other similar production systems and no good reason for the difference 
can be found it can have implications for the choice of indicators. There is also a possibility 
that critical failures with low probability has not showed up in the GFCSAT-data. This may 
also have implications for the choice of indicators.   
 
This chapter is divided into five sections. The three first sections are presentations of each of 
the three analyses and contain information about how and what information that is acquired. 
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The fourth section is a presentation of the combined results of the three analyses divided into 
categories. For each category, the key findings including the needed indicators are presented.   
 
In the last section, the analyzed data is summarized and it is drawn conclusions about which 
categories that is applicable for development of indicators. 
 
4.1. Health, safety and environment  
To achieve the goal “No serious incidents, including leaks”, data about historical accidents and 
HSE related incidents must be analyzed. Since the indicators to be developed are for monitoring 
the GFCSAT- wells in operation, only accidents and incidents related to the operations of 
subsea production systems are of interest. These rules out some of the more serious subsea 
related accidents like the Macondo accident, which was related to subsea well completion (BP, 
2010). One internal and one external source of information have been used. The internal source 
of GFCSAT-data that has been analyzed is historical records of incidents. The external source 
used is the DNV-GL report “Subsea Facilities – Technology Developments, Incidents and 
Future Trends” that was made in 2014 on behalf of the Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority 
(DNV GL, 2014). 
4.1.1. GFCSAT HSE-data 
The GFCSAT incident reports were retrieved from Synergi, Statoil’s system for recording HSE 
related data. The purpose of the system is to monitor, improve and learn from passed incidents 
(Statoil, 2015I). For this analysis the search in Synergi has been narrowed down to HSE-related 
incidents and non-conformities reported in 2001-2014.  
Statoil defines HSE incidents as “HSE incidents are hazards or accidents that have resulted in, 
or could result in, harm to persons and the environment” (Statoil, 2015J). Non-conformities 
are defined in Synergi as “Incidents or situations that: 1. Do not constitute hazard or accident 
situations and have resulted in harm, loss or defect. 2. Constitute hazard or accident situations 
that have not resulted in, or could not have resulted in, harm to persons or the environment” 
(Statoil, 2015I). Both HSE-incidents and non-conformities are part of the analysis and are 
referred to as Synergi-reports.  
 
The search in the Synergi database has been limited by means of the location. All reports that 
have the location GFC Subsea have been reviewed in detail. All report headlines for the 
locations GFC, GFC unspecified, GFC C-05, GFC C-08, GFC M-11, GFC M-19 and GFC M-
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19 have been review to find GFCSAT related reports. These cover the general locations, and 
the location of the key components on the subsea production system topside (Rotter, 2014). In 
addition to the above search, a spread sheet record from the subsea operations department of 
past incidents from 2001-2009, which contains references to the Synergi-system, has been 
reviewed. This search is not bulletproof and relevant reports that did not appear in this search 
are left out.  
The Synergi search and spread sheet record resulted in a total of 76 Synergi-reports for the 
analysis. Of these 76 reports, 24 were deemed as irrelevant. These reports were discarded either 
due to duplicated reports or that the incidents were caused by human error, operational 
conditions, or other causes that are not relevant for developing indicators. 
Most of the Synergi-reports are from the years 2001-2009 with only a few reports in the years 
2010 – 2014. The primary reason for this was a change in the way all malfunctions including 
non-conformities are reported. In 2009 the subsea operations department started using the 
maintenance management system SAP to a larger extent. This led to strongly reduced reporting 
of non-conformities in Synergi (Rotter, 2014). 
All Synergi reports are classified into 5 degrees of seriousness by Statoil, based on the actual 
consequence or the possible consequence under slightly different circumstances. The most 
serious degree relates to serious accidents like large spills, and the least serious degree is 
typically used for non-conformities that has led to or could have led to production losses 
(Statoil, 2015I). This is illustrated in table 2.  
C
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Category 
1 Sever 
2 Major 
3 Moderate 
4 Minor 
5 Insignificant 
Table 2: Simplified figure of the consequence categories used for classifying the Synergi-reports. Statoil uses 
the color codes, but the wording is added in this thesis. The Statoil table also contains detailed information 
about the criteria for the classification (Statoil, 2015I).  
 
By using this consequence classification, the Synergi reports are differentiated, giving a 
weighted result. A weighted result can to some extent emphasize the Synergi-reports that are 
most important for reaching the goal “No serious incidents, including leaks”. The method used 
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is to give all incident-reports a score inversely proportional to the consequence category, i.e. a 
consequence category 1 (red) get a score of 5 and a category 5 (green) get a score of 1. 
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4.1.2. HSE-data from external sources 
The external sources were recently reviewed by DNV-GL in the report “Subsea Facilities – 
Technology Developments, Incidents and Future Trends” that was made on behalf of the 
Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority. This report has a chapter that covers incidents related 
to subsea facilities, with the main focus on leaks. In this chapter several sources of information 
regarding incidents in Norway, USA and UK are reviewed.  
The first problem DNV-GL encountered was finding data that for a certainty is related to subsea 
production systems, the second problem was finding data that show the root cause for the 
incidents.  
Of the relevant reports there were few reports that for a certainty could be related to subsea 
operations making the results less important for finding needed indicators. There were however 
some useful information about subsea related leaks and the most serious incidents in both 
Norway and UK.  (DNV GL, 2014) 
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4.2. OPEX-cost 
The second goal for developing indicators is «minimize OPEX cost». To reach this goal OPEX-
costs must be examined to find possibilities for cost reductions. The allocation of OPEX-costs 
for the Gullfaks Satellites in 2011 is shown in figure 7. Although this figure includes more wells 
than just GFCSAT wells, the numbers should be representative (Rotter, 2014).  
 
Figure 7: Distribution of OPEX-cost for Gullfaks subsea facilities in 2011. The cost is broken down according to 
the budget structure (Rotter, 2014). 
The cost related to Subsea Inspection, Subsea emergency preparedness, Subsea tool pool and 
Pipeline operations are fixed costs. O&M projects is the cost of ongoing projects related to the 
operations of the Gullfaks Satellites, this is a non-fixed cost but it is not considered part of the 
scope of this thesis. Subsea operational support is the cost associated with daily operation and 
maintenance of the Gullfaks Satellites. About 70 % of this cost is related to maintenance, with 
the cost of intervention vessels and repair of modules as the two largest parts (Rotter, 2014). 
The remaining 30% cover all other support functions such as the subsea operations department. 
This distribution show that maintenance is the largest part of non fixed OPEX-costs for the 
Gullfaks Satellites. Based on this, the maintenance cost will be studied in detail in this thesis. 
To minimize maintenance costs, past costs have to be analyzed in order to find areas where 
reductions can be made. Since the goal is to develop indicators for the subsea production 
system, this thesis aims to detect failures early and help keep track of existing failures in order 
to cut maintenance cost and thereby OPEX-cost. Doing this may contribute to efficient and 
economical maintenance management.  
OPEX-cost Gullfaks Satelllittes 2011 
Subsea emergency preparedness Subsea Inspection
Subsea operational support Subsea tool pool
Pipline operations O&M projects
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The primary sources of maintenance records to be analyzed are the records for the GFCSAT-
production system. In addition to this, the OREDA database is used. This database has 
registered maintenance data from the GFCSAT production system and other similar systems 
(SINTEF, 2009).  
4.2.1. GFCSAT maintenance data 
Failures and malfunctions are reported in the maintenance management program SAP. These 
malfunction reports or M2 notifications are processed in daily meetings. If action is to be taken 
a work order is created from the notification. All activities related to fixing the malfunction 
should be recorded in the notification or work order. Work orders should amongst other things 
contain information about cost.  
The search for relevant notifications in SAP was limited to notification on the tag numbers of 
the GFCSAT wells, the system tag and all tag numbers starting with the system number. Reports 
for the period 2001-2014 were used in the analysis. In addition the subsea operations 
department spread sheet record of past malfunctions from 2001-2009 was included.  
The SAP and spread sheet record contains a total of 507 malfunction reports. All of these reports 
were analyzed. 258 malfunction reports were found to be irrelevant. The three primary reasons 
for the irrelevant reports were that the report did not contain a malfunction, duplicated reporting 
and minor topside malfunction. Only topside malfunctions that pose a risk to the subsea 
production system were used in the analysis of common and critical failures. This is in 
accordance with which malfunctions the subsea operations department is involved in today 
(Rotter, 2014).  
The SAP records show that the offshore part of the operations has used SAP for recording 
malfunctions in M2 notifications since 2001. However, the subsea operations department 
onshore did not use SAP to full extent before 2010. Most of the malfunctions for the subsea 
production system for the years 2001-2009 are therefore retrieved from the spreadsheet record. 
The spreadsheet data is similar to the notification data, but less detailed. Differences in the SAP-
records and the spreadsheet record makes it more difficult to find trends. The main function of 
the malfunction reports in SAP is to report malfunctions in order to create work orders for fixing 
the problem. The spreadsheet records were primarily made to keep track of ongoing tasks and 
for historical records (Rotter, 2014). 
Classification of the malfunction reports in terms of severity or importance for reaching the 
goal “minimizing OPEX-cost” is not possible without multiple, and possible large sources of 
error. It is impossible to find the actual cost of repairing the reported failures. Costs can be 
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found on SAP work orders created from the SAP malfunction reports. However, they do not 
necessarily contain all costs. A typical example is that the cost of an intervention for correcting 
multiple failures is not distributed on all the appropriate work orders. Another possibility for 
classification would be to use a priority classification assigned to all SAP malfunction reports. 
This classification is not assigned to say anything about costs, only about how critical it is to 
fix the malfunction. In addition to these sources of error the spread sheet records contain neither 
priority nor costs. Therefore the malfunction reports are not weighted and only the numbers 
count. 
4.2.2. Maintenance data from external sources  
An external source of maintenance data for both comparing data and for finding possible 
overlooked failure modes is the OREDA database. The data is collected from 8 worldwide 
companies including Statoil, and it is compiled and presented in a useful way. OREDA’s main 
purpose is the collect and analyze data for improving reliability, availability, maintenance and 
safety. The data used in this thesis is collected in the period 1997 to 2003, and presented in the 
OREDA offshore reliability data handbook 5 edition, 2009. (SINTEF, 2009) 
The OREDA data is divided into, and presented in equipment classes, subunits and components. 
Subsea equipment is divided into the 8 equipment classes Control Systems, Flowlines, 
Manifolds, Pipelines, Risers, Running tools, Templates and Wellhead and X-mas tree. The 
equipment classes Running tools, Risers and Pipelines are outside the scope of this thesis 
because they are not relevant for the daily operation of the GFCSAT. 
Each equipment class is divided into equipment units. Control Systems are for example divided 
into Control Systems X-mas tree and Control Systems Manifold. This thesis does not separate 
between the equipment units, but use totals from each equipment class. 
The equipment classes are further divided into subunits such as Subsea control module. For 
each subunit several different failure modes are listed and divided into 4 different severity 
classes. This data is later presented at a component level with the same listings of failure modes 
divided into severity classes. For each of these the number of units, number of failures, failure 
rate data and active repair time is listed, see table 3. For failure rate several numbers are listed, 
when referring to failure rate in this thesis the reference is to the n/τ rate (see table 3). 
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Taxonomy no Item 
Population Installations  Calendar time (106 hours) 
Severity class / Failure mode No of 
units 
No of 
failures  
Failure rate(per (106 hours)  
Active rep. 
time (hrs) 
Lower Mean Upper  SD n/τ Mean 
SUBUNIT NO 1                   
   Severity class                  
      Failure modes                 
                  
Component no 1.1                 
   Severity class                  
      Failure modes                 
                  
Component no 1.p                 
   Severity class                  
      Failure modes                 
Table 3: The format of the reliability data tables in the OREDA offshore reliability handbook volume 2 
Subsea, (SINTEF, 2009, s. 35). 
The data is also complied in tables showing failure mechanisms versus failure modes at 
component level, se table 4.  
 
Component Failure mechanism Failure 
mode 1 
Failure 
mode 2 
… Σ C+D Total 
Component 1.1 Failure mechanism 1           
  Failure mechanism 2           
  ….           
              
Component 1.p Failure mechanism 1           
  Failure mechanism 2           
  ….           
              
Table 4: Format of the failure mechanism versus failure mode tables (SINTEF, 2009, s. 37). 
OREDA-data is categorized and presented for each system and component with related failure 
mechanisms and failure modes. The OREDA-data and the analyzed GFCSAT data are collected 
with different purposes; OREDA analyzes the reliability of components and systems while the 
GFCSAT data in this thesis is analyzed in order to find relevant indicators. Direct comparison 
of the failure rates with the GFCSAT-data and the OREDA-date is therefore challenging and 
of little use.  
The OREDA data is reviewed in order to evaluate the data from GFCSAT, both in terms of the 
ratio of failures in each category, and to determine if all failure modes are included. Where the 
GFCSAT categories and the OREDA equipment classes or subunits are comparable the failure 
rates are listed. However no calculations for comparison are performed. It is just for comparing 
33 
 
the failure rate to other failure rates in OREDA, in turn the ratio can be compared to the ratio 
in the GFCSAT data. The most important comparison between GFCSAT and OREDA data is 
comparing failure modes and failure mechanisms. This is especially to find common or critical 
failures that have not showed up or have been overlooked in the GFCSAT analysis. If new 
failure modes are found it is a possibility that the needed indicators must be changed. If the 
OREDA data show that failures in one category is significantly more common than the 
GFCSAT data indicate there may be need to emphasize the category beyond what the GFCSAT-
data originally indicated. 
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4.3. PE-losses 
The third and last goal for the indicators is “minimize subsea related PE-losses”. Since the 
indicators are for monitoring the subsea production system only subsea related PE-losses are of 
interest. No external sources of relevant information were found, but Statoil internal data has 
been briefly reviewed. 
4.3.1. GFCSAT PE-data 
All production losses on Statoil operated fields or facilities are to be registered on a daily basis. 
Each loss is registered with start, stop, category, volume, involved tag or system number and a 
comment (Ravneberg, 2015). For the GFCSAT-wells, closing production wing valves will 
automatically generate a production loss report in the computer program EC. Additional 
information is registered by the CCR-operator and quality is assured in both daily and monthly 
meetings. If the production loss is not related to reservoir management it is counted as a 
production efficiency loss or PE-loss.  
The program EC has only been used to record this data for GFCSAT-wells since 2010. 
Recordings before 2010 are more uncertain and are categorized differently (Ravneberg, 2015), 
and are therefore not used in this analysis.  All losses related to or caused by problems in the 
subsea system are categorized in a category of its own. 
The search for subsea related PE-losses for the GFCSAT wells was conducted in a PE-analysis 
program that retrieves its data from EC. To ensure the correctness of the search it was conducted 
by analyst Hanne Ravneberg (Ravneberg, 2015). The search resulted in 12 PE-losses. 6 of these 
losses were caused by human error, well testing or other causes irrelevant for developing 
indicators. 
The total PE-loss in standard cubic meters (Sm3) of oil are given for all the PE-losses. By using 
this unified measure the PE-losses’ severity and relevance for achiving the goal “Minimize 
subsea related PE-losses” can be classified. Neither the reporting program EC nor the analysis 
program has a classification system. Therefore, the classification system for production losses 
or economical losses in Synergi has been used for the classification: 
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Category Description 
1 Very large cost/losses 
2 Large cost/losses 
3 Medium cost/losses 
4 Minor cost /losses 
5 Negligible cost/losses 
Table 5: Synergi classification for production losses and costs (Statoil, 2015I). 
According to the requirements for Synergi consequence classification, all the PE-losses found 
are classified as either minor or insignificant. As for the Synergi-reports the method used is to 
give all PE-loss reports a score inversely proportional to the consequence category, i.e. a 
consequence category minor gets a score of 2 and insignificant gets a score of 1. The severity 
classification is done to emphasize the larger and more important losses. 
4.3.2. PE-data from other sources 
A search in external sources uncover many publications that emphasize the need for high 
production efficiency. The department of Energy & Climate Change in the UK even identified 
it as a key challenge in 2013 after a significant drop in production efficiency the last years 
(Cowie, 2014). However, few documents contain more than general terms and none of the 
publications found are relevant for minimizing PE-losses on a subsea production system.     
Since no relevant PE-data from external sources are found, some Statoil internal data has been 
quickly reviewed. The neighboring Gullfaks South wells tied back to Gullfaks A show similar 
findings with few losses. A quick look at other subsea fields reveal that one have to go no 
further than to the oil field Tordis that is tied back to Gullfaks C to find different numbers 
(Ravneberg, 2015). However, this facility is much more complex with water injection and 
subsea separation and therefore less relevant for GFCSAT (Statoil, 2015K). As no relevant PE-
data from other sources are found, only Statoil internal data is used for this analysis.  
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4.4. Analysis results 
The analysis of HSE related Synergi-reports for GFCSAT in the period 2001-2014 resulted in 
52 relevant reports that with severity weighting accounts for a total score of 86 points. The 
analysis of malfunction reports for GFCSAT from SAP and spread sheet records for the period 
2001-2014 resulted in 249 relevant reports. These reports were not weighted and therefore 
account for a total score of 249 points. The analysis of subsea related PE-losses for the period 
2010-2014 resulted in 6 relevant reports that with severity rating account for a total score of 10 
points. These data are summarized in table 6. 
Goal 
area 
Analysis 
material 
Weighted 
score 
Percentage 
of total 
HSE  Synergi reports 86 25 % 
OPEX  
Malfunction 
reports 249 72 % 
PE-
losses  PE-loss reports 10 3 % 
Total   345 100 % 
Table 6: Summary of analysis data. 
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The reports from these three analyses have been combined into one record. This combined 
record has again been divided into 11 categories based on common failure mechanisms and 
needed indicators. Figure 8 shows the categories and the distribution between them for the 
combined records.  
 
 
Figure 8: The distribution between the categories. The weighted scores are used, i.e. one severe Synergi and 
PE-loss report can count up to 5 times as much as a less serious Synergi or PE-report. All malfunction reports 
only account for one point. 
 
Each of the 11 categories will in the remainder of this chapter be presented with information 
about the category, common failures, trends and failure modes that need to be detected by 
indicators.  The findings in the categories will also be compared to the findings from external 
sources.  
 
  
27,5 %
21,7 %
9,0 %
8,7 %
7,5 %6,7 %
5,5 %
5,2 %
3,2 %
3,2 %
1,7 %
Distribution between the 11 categories 
Communication Mech.damages and corr. Hydraulics
Sensors Downhole gauges Multiphase meter
Internal leakage in valves External leakage Hydrate
Annulus Choke
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4.4.1. Communication 
This category covers all malfunctions, incidents and PE-losses related to problems and 
malfunctions in the communication between the CCR and the subsea SEMs. This category also 
includes failures in the power supply. Since power and communication signals are distributed 
in the same cables, they are too closely related to differentiate in different categories. 
 
GFCSAT Analysis  
27,5% of the points from the combined analysis results are related to reports of communication 
problems. These problems are reported in Synergi reports, malfunction reports and PE-loss 
reports. None of the reports have received a high severity classification.  
 
Most of the malfunctions in this category are related to no signal or erroneous communication 
with one or more SEMs. The causes of the problems were many, sometimes complex, and the 
available information was not always sufficient to determine the cause rof the error. The 
problems were either fixed by problem solving from GFC or by replacement of units. The PE-
losses are primarily related to these replacements. The most common unit to fail is the SEM or 
the components inside the SEM units.  
 
There are also some cases where several SEMs are not communicating properly. In these cases, 
the problems are somewhere in the infrastructure between the SEM and PCDA, often related to 
the communication cables and jumpers or in the overpower protection system topside.  
 
There has been changes in the reporting practice during the time period analyzed. This makes 
it challenging to analyze trends. There is however a tendency towards more reports in later 
years.  
 
Based on the reports in this category there is need for indicators that can detect the following 
failure modes:  
 No signal from one SEM 
 No signal from multiple SEMs  
 Failures in the electrical power supply 
 
 
 
Analysis of other sources  
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The data from the DNV-GL report does not contain information about failures in the 
communication system (DNV GL, 2014). Failures in the communication system should 
generally not cause serious incidents alone but it could contribute, e.g. failure in the control 
system was an important part of the Macondo incident (BP, 2010).  
 
OREDA contains information about an equipment class named control systems, which covers 
much of the same systems and components as the communication category in this thesis. The 
primary difference between the two is that OREDA’s equipment class is somewhat wider. It 
does for example include subsea sensors and the hydraulic systems. The failure rate for the 
equipment class control systems of 162,35 failures per million hours of operation is by far the 
highest for any of the subsea equipment classes. The most common unit to fail is the subsea 
control module with the most common subunit to fail being the subsea electronic module. 
The most common failure modes for control systems when hydraulic and sensor related failures 
are not included are; other, failure to function on demand, control or signal failure, 
transmission failure and short circuit. The most common failure mechanisms are control 
failure, earth/isolation fault and electrical failure. (SINTEF, 2009) 
 
The findings in OREDA are mostly similar to the findings in the GFCSAT data. One failure 
mode that came up in OREDA that is not listed before is failure to function on demand. This is 
however a failure mode that is less relevant for an indicator since it would be detected at once 
by the operator sending the signal. There are not found any reasons to change the failure modes 
nor to put additional emphasize on the category communication. 
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4.4.2. Mechanical damages and corrosion 
This section covers all reports of mechanical or corrosion related damages to the subsea 
production system, with the exception of mechanical damages and corrosion that have led to 
malfunctions in other categories, i.e. a mechanical damage causing an external leak is 
categorized in external leaks. The category contains no failures in topside equipment. 
 
Analysis results  
21,7% of the points from the combined analysis results are related to reports of mechanical 
damages or corrosion. Mechanical damages and corrosion are reported in both Synergi reports 
and malfunction reports but not in any PE-loss reports. None of the reports have a high severity 
classification.  
This is a category that contains a wide variety of failures or damages, most of them less 
extensive. The most common failure mechanism in the reports are HISC where a few are actual 
damages, the remaining are reported to perform work to determine the condition of equipment 
that could be subject to HISC. Other failures in this category are; damaged connection for 
control equipment, damaged hinges and locking for protective structure hatches, corrosion, 
damaged ROV-operated valves and some mechanical damages caused by trawl board impact.  
A significant number of the reports were written before and during an extensive repair and 
inspection campaign. The high number of especially Synergi reports in this campaign can 
indicate some differences in systems used for reporting. Apart from that, there are no 
identifiable trends.    
Mechanical or corrosion related damages are uncovered during inspections or interventions and 
are therefore difficult or impossible to detect for the indicators. The only damages that can be 
detected are leaks or damages that disrupt the function of equipment such as sensors. These 
possible scenarios are covered in the categories for external leaks and sensor malfunctions.   
 
Analysis of other sources  
Since this category is more or less irrelevant for finding needed indicators, no comparison of 
the collected data with other sources has been done.   
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4.4.3. Hydraulics 
This category covers all reports of failures in the hydraulic system subsea, and topside problems 
that has the potential to disrupt supply.  
 
Analysis results  
9,0% of the points from the combined analysis results are related to reports of problems in the 
hydraulic system.  Hydraulic related problems are reported in both Synergi reports and 
malfunction reports but not in any PE-loss reports. None of the reports have received a high 
severity classification.  
The reports in this category are evenly divided between topside and subsea malfunctions. The 
topside malfunctions are internal leaks in valves or problems with supply pressure regulation. 
The most common subsea malfunction is leakage in the control lines for downhole equipment, 
i.e. hydraulic fluid leaking into the well. Other problems are external leaks in mounting base or 
valve actuators and internal leakage in a control valve inside the SCM.  
Several of the failures are reported in two short time periods. Two possible explanations are 
that extensive troubleshooting initiated to uncover a malfunction uncovered multiple 
malfunctions, or that multiple reports related to the same underlying malfunction were 
generated. Apart from this, there are no significant trends. 
 
Based on the reports in this category there is need for indicators that can detect the following 
failure modes:  
 Internal leaks in valves topside 
 Unstable or low hydraulic supply pressure  
 External leakage subsea 
 Internal leakage in the SCM 
 
Analysis of other sources  
In the incident data for NCS from 1999-2013 listed in the DNV-GL-report, hydraulics is not 
singled out. DNV-GL report that there are reports of 80 leaks of both hydrocarbons and control 
fluids. Of these leaks a significant number relates to leaks of control fluids. The report also 
refers to an incident in 2012 where “16.5 m3 control fluid more than planned was released over 
a period of 14 days. Normal release is 4.2 m3 in 14 days“ (DNV GL, 2014). 
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In OREDA the main parts of the hydraulic system is in the equipment class control systems. 
This equipment class covers the hydraulic system from the HPU to the SCM, including 
couplers, jumpers and lines in the distribution system. It is not possible to find an overall failure 
rate for the hydraulic system in OREDA, but for HPU the failure rate is 66,4 failures /million 
hours. However, this is all HPU failures. In the GFCSAT analysis only critical failures with the 
potential to disrupt supply is part of the analysis. Another difficulty in comparing the GFCSAT 
data to OREDA is that in large parts of the OREDA data it is not possible to distinguish between 
the hydraulic system and other utility systems, such as chemical systems. By assuming that the 
same failures are relevant for both hydraulics and other utility systems, the most common 
failure modes are external leakage of utility medium, internal leakage of utility medium and 
failures due to plugging/choking. The most common failure mechanisms are leakage, blockage 
and burst. In addition, there are several accounts of the failure mode external leakage of utility 
medium for valves in the equipment classes manifolds and for valves and hydraulic couplers in 
the equipment class XMT and wellhead. (SINTEF, 2009) 
 
The findings in the DNV-GL report and OREDA are in accordance with the findings in the 
GFCSAT-data. There are not found any reasons to change the failure modes nor to put 
additional emphasize on the category hydraulics. 
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4.4.4. Sensors 
This category covers all reports that relates to malfunctions in only one sensor regardless of the 
failure or cause.  
 
Analysis of GFCSAT-data 
8,7% of the points from the combined analysis results are related to reports of problems with 
sensors. Sensor related problems are reported in both Synergi reports and malfunction reports 
but not in any PE-loss reports. None of the reports have a high severity classification. 
These reports relates to different types of sensors, from temperature gauges on the production 
line to voltage sensors inside the SCM. All reports are of sensors with the following problems: 
no signal, incorrect reading, out of range reading or unstable signal on one sensor. The most 
common sensor to fail is a sand sensor located on the FCM-module. Other sensors are the 
temperature and pressure gauges on the FCM module and sensors inside the SCM. 
There is no clear trend in the data but there is a tendency towards a decreasing number of 
reports.  
 
Based on the reports in this category there is need for indicators that can detect the following 
failure modes:  
        No signal from one sensor 
 Out of range reading/value  
 Incorrect reading/value 
 Unstable signal 
 
Analysis of other sources  
The data from the DNV-GL report does not contain information about sensor failures causing 
incidents.  Failures in sensor systems should generally not cause serious incidents alone but it 
can contribute to such incidents. (DNV GL, 2014) 
 
OREDA has a category named sensors under the equipment class control systems. This category 
covers the same as the sensor category in this thesis making the results comparable. The failure 
rate in the OREDA data is 8,49 failures/million hours in operations. The sensors with highest 
failure rates are flow sensors, sand detection sensors and combined pressure and temperature 
sensors. The most common failure modes are erratic output, abnormal instrument reading and 
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signal failure.  The most common failure mechanisms are general instrument failure, faulty 
signal, blockage and no signal. (SINTEF, 2009) 
 
Of the failure mechanisms and modes the only one that has not come up in the GFCSAT data 
is blockage. It is difficult to know for sure why this failure mechanism has not been found in 
the GFCSAT data. It may be because the medium that is in the system does not contain 
components that leads to blockage. 
 
Based on these findings there are not found any reasons to change the failure modes nor to put 
additional emphasize on the category sensors. 
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4.4.5. Downhole gauges  
This category covers all reports of malfunctions in the communication with the downhole 
gauges. This is a category of its own because there are a significant number of reports describing 
errors in the communication with the downhole gauges only.  
 
Analysis results  
7,5% of the points from the combined analysis results are related to reports of problems with 
the downhole gauges. Problems with downhole gauges are reported in both Synergi reports and 
malfunction reports, but not in any PE-loss reports. None of the reports have received a high 
severity classification.  
 
The reported problems are frozen values, unstable values or no signal from one or multiple 
downhole gauges. Some of the problems are related to communication and are solved from 
Gullfaks C. Most are failures in equipment such as gauges, cables or control modules.  
 
The data shows a small drop in number of reports the last years. This can however relate to 
fewer gauges in operation. Downhole equipment is generally not repaired unless recompletion 
of the well is done for other reasons (Rotter, 2014).  
 
Based on the reports in this category there is need for indicators that can detect the following 
failure modes:  
 No signal from one downhole gauge 
 No signal from all downhole gauges in one well 
 Value out of range. 
 Unstable signal  
 
Analysis of other sources  
There is no information or data about downhole gauges in the DNV-GL report or OREDA.  
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4.4.6. Multiphase meter 
This category covers all reports of problems related to the multiphase meter. This is treated as 
a category of its own because there are a significant number of reports describing errors in the 
communication with the multiphase meter. Furthermore, there are only installed multiphase 
meters on the five N-wells that started operating in 2007. 
 
Analysis results  
6,7% of the points from the combined analysis results are related to reports of problems with 
multiphase meters. Multiphase meter problems are reported in both Synergi reports and 
malfunction reports, but not in any PE-loss reports. None of the reports have received a high 
severity classification.  
 
Most of the failures in this category are related to problems with the communication between 
the multiphase meters and the CCR. These failures cause frozen or no values from one or 
multiple multiphase meters. In most of the cases, communication was restored again after a 
reset or other measures conducted from Gullfaks C. In addition to communication problems, 
incorrect readings have also been reported. 
 
There are only five multiphase meters, all installed in 2007. This results in a significantly 
shorter time span than for the other categories. Most of the reports are from the first years in 
operation and there is a trend towards fewer malfunction reports the last three years.  
 
Based on the reports in this category there is need for indicators that can detect the following 
failure modes:  
 No signal from one multiphase flow meter 
 No signal from multiple multiphase flow meters 
 Incorrect reading 
 
Analysis of other sources  
There is no information or data about multiphase flow meters in the DNV-GL report or 
OREDA.  
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4.4.7. Internal leak in valves 
This category covers all reports related to internal leaks in subsea valves with the exception of 
choke valves and valves related to the annulus. Both of these valves are categories of their own.  
The choke valves have different failure mechanisms than the barrier valves covered in this 
category. Valves associated with the annulus are categorized in that category when both 
detection and problems are related to the annulus.  
 
Analysis results  
5,5 % of the points from the combined analysis results are related to reports of internal leaks in 
valves. Internal valve leaks are reported in Synergi reports, malfunction reports and PE-loss 
reports. None of the reports have received a high severity classification.  
Most of the leaks are discovered as a result of regular testing of barrier valves defined in the 
preventive maintenance program. Leaks in non-barrier valves are most often discovered as a 
result of testing prior to operations or projects that are going to use the valves. A few leaks are 
found as a result of suspicion, e.g. caused by pressure changes in closed systems. The PE-losses 
identified results from either testing or changes in operations as a result of a leaking valve.  
The irregular testing makes it difficult to identify any trends.  
Most of the leaks are detected and can only be detected by testing the valves. There are however 
a few failures where an indicator could have been used for detecting unusual pressure or 
pressure changes in closed systems. In addition, degradation of the valves can be found by 
analyzing the valve profile, but this can hardly be done by simply applying an indicator.  
Based the finding this category is not applicable for development of indicators.  
 
Analysis of other sources  
The DNV-GL-report does not contain information about internal leaks in valves.  
The valves included in the OREDA report for this category are divided into two types of 
valves; manifold process isolation valves and XT process isolation valves. Downhole valves 
are not a part of the OREDA-data.  For manifold process isolation valves the failure rate is 
1,42 failure /million hours. The most common failure mechanisms are mechanical failure and 
leakage. The most common failure modes are external leakage of process medium, failure to 
close on demand and leakage in closed position. For XT process isolation valves the most 
common failure mechanism are leakage, and the most common failure mode is leakage in 
closed position. (SINTEF, 2009) 
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Apart from the external leaks in manifold process isolation valves that are not covered by this 
category, the failure modes and mechanisms are to some extent comparable to the findings in 
the GFCSAT data. The OREDA data does not contain any information that changes the 
conclusion that this category is not applicable for development of indicators.  
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4.4.8. External leaks  
This category covers all reports of external leaks of both hydrocarbon and all utility mediums, 
with the exception of hydraulic fluids and annulus related leaks that are covered in other 
categories.  
 
Analysis results  
5,2 % of the points from the combined analysis results are related to reports of external leaks 
from the subsea production. External leaks are reported in Synergi reports and malfunction 
reports, but not in any PE-loss reports. This category consists of the only two incidents that 
have high severity classifications.  
There have been reported only four external leaks. These four leaks get 5,2% of the points 
because of a high severity classification, and because the same incidents come up as both 
Synergi and malfunction reports. The most serious leak and the only incident in consequence 
category red 1 out of all the 52 Synergi reports was a gas leak detected during inspection in 
2003. Gas was leaking from a HISC caused crack in one of the seabed flowlines connecting the 
templates to Gullfaks C. Similar HISC-problems also caused leaks on other fields in that time 
period (Tveit, 2006).This incident is the only one related to hydrocarbon leakage, the other three 
are leaks related to utility systems. One of these leaks is severity classified as red 2 due to the 
quantity of the release. 
All the reports are more than 10 years old, indicating that leaks were a larger problem in the 
first years in operation.  
It can be challenging to detect external leaks from all parts of the system. However an indicator 
that can detect some of the leaks is a possibility. An indicator for this category should detect 
the following failure modes: 
 External leakage of hydrocarbons 
 External leakage of utility medium 
 
Analysis of other sources  
The DNV-GL report focuses on external leakage of hydrocarbons in the incident chapter. The 
key findings for NCS in the period 1999-2013 is that there was about 80 releases of both 
hydrocarbons and control fluid. Most of these have unknown causes and only 10 can be directly 
linked to causes related to operations. The key findings for UK are somewhat limited due to 
difficulties in distinguishing between topside and subsea leaks. 22 reports can be linked to 
subsea leaks of hydrocarbons. Most of these have unknown causes and only 4 are directly 
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related to operations. The most serious incidents are listed for both NCS and UK. Out of these 
6 incidents all but one are more than 10 years old. The only new incident was a release of 2,5 
tons of oil due to an error operation of a bleed valve. The other five were caused by rupture in 
a connection, wrong operation of a valve, mechanical failure, dropped object and HISC. The 
conclusion drawn in the report is that “releases from subsea production systems are relatively 
few and small compared to releases from other activities e.g. installation, work, and drilling”. 
(DNV GL, 2014) 
 
OREDA has two failure modes that are relevant for this category; these are external leaks of 
process medium and external leaks of utility medium. Since these are failure modes, and not 
equipment classes or subunits, the approach for analyzing the data is different.  
For the equipment class control systems only the failure mode external leaks of utility medium 
is listed. The leaks are mostly related to hydraulics, and only 10 accounts of leakage in chemical 
injection couplers are relevant. 
For the equipment class flowlines there are two accounts of external leaks of process medium 
but both are in flexible pipes and are therefore not relevant. 
For the equipment class manifold there are 33 accounts of external leaks of process medium 
and 5 accounts of external leaks of utility medium. The most common component to leak is 
process isolation valves and the most common failure mechanism is mechanical failure. 
For the equipment class XMT and Wellhead there are 11 accounts of external leaks of process 
medium and 22 accounts of external leaks of utility medium. The most common component to 
leak process medium is connectors and the most common failure mechanism is leakage. For 
leaks of utility medium most are related to hydraulics. (SINTEF, 2009) 
 
Based on these findings there are not found reasons to change the failure modes nor to put 
additional emphasize on the category external leaks. 
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4.4.9. Hydrates  
This category covers all problems caused by hydrates.  
 
Analysis results  
3,2% of the points from the combined analysis results are related to hydrates. Hydrate problems 
are reported in both Synergi reports and malfunction reports, but not in any PE-loss reports. 
None of the reports have a high severity classification.  
 
Most hydrates are located in the annulus bleed line also referred to as the service line. There 
are also a few reports of hydrates in the production line downstream of the choke valve. One 
report also describes hydrates affecting valve operations. The most common cause seems to be 
operations in connection with start-up of a well.  
 
There is no significant trend in the data.  
 
Based on the reports, hydrates is not a problem during normal operations and is therefore not 
applicable of the development of indicators.   
 
Analysis of other sources  
There is no information or data about hydrates in the DNV-GL report or OREDA.  
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4.4.10. Annulus 
All reports related to fluids leaking in or out of the production annulus is covered by this 
category. 
 
Analysis results  
3,2% of the points from the combined analysis results are related to leaks in or out of the 
production annulus. Annulus leaks are reported in Synergi reports, malfunction reports and PE-
loss reports. None of the reports have a high severity classification.  
 
Nearly all the reports relate to pressure buildup due to fluids leaking into the annulus and only 
a few are of unstable or dropping pressure. The most common cause is internal leak in valves, 
especially the XOV-valve.  
 
Most of the reports are from the last six years. This may be the result of annulus-related leaks 
is a growing problem or that the increase is a result of changes in the reporting procedures in 
2009.  
 
Based on the reports in this category there is need for indicators that can detect the following 
failure modes:  
 Pressure build up in the annulus 
 Small pressure drops in the annulus 
 
Analysis of other sources  
The DNV-GL report contains no information about leaks related to the production annulus.  
 
In OREDA the XOV-valve can not be distinguished from other process isolation valves. 
However, the most common failure mechanism for these valves are leakage, and the most 
common failure mode is leakage in closed position. There are no data for leakages in the well 
but both internal and external leakage in the tubing hanger and annulus seal assembly is reported 
in the OREDA data. The failure rate is very low. (SINTEF, 2009) 
 
Based on these findings there is not found any reason to change the results from the GFCSAT 
data, the failure modes, or emphasize the category beyond the points it has received in the 
GFCSAT data analysis.  
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4.4.11. Choke 
This category covers all problems that are related to the subsea choke valves.  
 
Choke related problems  
1,7% of the points from the combined analysis results are related to choke valves. Failures 
related to choke valves are reported in both Synergi reports and malfunction reports, but not in 
any PE-loss reports. None of the reports have a high severity classification.  
The reports in this category are related to failures in the position sensor, damaged valve or 
abrasion of the valve interior.  
 
There is no trend in the data. 
 
Based on the reports in this category there is need for indicators that can detect the following 
failure modes:  
 Mismatch between flow and reported position 
 Abrasion of the choke valve 
 
Analysis of other sources  
The DNV-GL report contains no data related to choke valves.  
 
In OREDA choke valves can be found under the equipment classes Wellhead and X-mas trees 
and choke module. The total failure rate is 19,07 failures /million hours in operation. The most 
common failure mechanisms for choke valves are control failure, leakage and mechanical 
failure. The most common failure modes for choke valves are failure to function on demand 
common /combined cause and failure to close on demand. (SINTEF, 2009) 
 
Based on these findings there is not found any reason to change the results from the GFCSAT 
data, the needed indicators or emphasize the category beyond the points it has received in the 
GFCSAT data analysis. 
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4.5. Conclusion 
Based on the results from the analysis, there are few or none failure modes that are detectable 
by sensor signals for the categories: Mechanical damages and corrosion, internal leakage in 
valves and hydrates. The remaining eight categories will be further studied for development of 
indicators in chapter seven. 
 
The GFCSAT-analyses for the eight remaining categories are in accordance with findings from 
external sources. This supports the findings in the analysis, and the relevance of these findings. 
It was not deemed necessary to change the results from the GFCSAT data, the failure modes 
nor emphasize the category beyond the points it has received in the GFCSAT data analysis for 
any of the categories. 
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5. Development of indicators 
The continuous condition monitoring of the GFCSAT subsea production system is conducted 
by the CCR-operators on Gullfaks C. They report abnormalities and failures to the appropriate 
onshore departments. The majority of reports will be reported to the subsea operations 
department that troubleshoot and conduct measures. In addition the subsea engineers on a daily 
basis collect and review data to ensure that they have an overview of parameters of importance 
to the technical integrity and availability of the system. (Rotter, 2014). The indicators developed 
in this chapter are intended to be a tool in this process. By finding a few key condition indicators 
for each well the subsea engineers can obtain a quick overview of the technical condition of 
each well.  
 
These key condition indicators can be shown as simple traffic light indicators that indicate as 
many of the failure modes found in the analysis in chapter 6 as possible. To develop the 
indicators each of the remaining 8 categories relevant for finding indicators will be studied in 
detail. In each of the 8 categories possible indicators are found for each relevant failure mode 
and reviewed using a checklist approach. Based on the checklists for the possible indicators, 
one or a combination of several possible indicators are selected. The selected indicator is 
checked against the reports in the corresponding category to get a measure of what percentage 
of failures that could be detected by the selected indicator. The selected indicators for each of 
the 8 categories are compared before the final selection of  key condition indicators.   
 
This chapter is divided into 9 subchapter, one for each of the 8 categories relevant for indicators 
and a final subchapter for selection of the 4 key condition indicators. The system descriptions 
are based on theory presented in chapter 2. 
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5.1. Communication 
This category covers all failures in the power and communication system between the CCR and 
the SEM-units subsea.  
 
System description 
The CCR-operators control and monitor the subsea production system from the operator 
stations (OS) in the CCR. All sensor readings displayed and all commands that are initiated 
come from or are relayed to the subsea control unit (SCU). The SCU is a computer for operating 
the subsea production system. All communication between the SCU and the subsea systems 
pass through the SPCU. In the SPCU modems enable transmission of the communication 
signals over the power lines, i.e. both power and communication are distributed over the same 
lines to the subsea systems. The SPCU and the distribution system is built with redundancy. 
 
Figure 9: A simplified overview of the relevant equipment for the category Communication. 
At the individual templates subsea, the power lines from the SPCU connect to an umbilical 
termination head. The termination head contain two transformers for stepping down the voltage, 
before the cables connect to two splitter boxes that divide the power and communication. Each 
splitter box has one line to each of the wells, i.e. two lines for each well. These lines connect to 
the SCM that connects one line to each of the two SEMs. Each SEM has modems for sending 
and receiving communication and transformers for supply voltage. Each SEM can in turn 
control and monitor the whole system connected to the SCM. This ensures a redundant system 
from the SPCU to the individual sensors or control valves.  
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A limiting factor in the system is the bandwidth in the communication system. To limit the 
amount of sent data the SEM only send the data requested by the SCU.    
 
Development of indicators  
Based on the findings in the analysis of communication related reports there is a need for 
indicators detecting the following failure modes: 
 No signal from one SEM 
 No signal from multiple SEMs  
 Failures in the electrical power supply 
 
For each of these failure modes, one or two possible indicators will be suggested in table 7. 
Possible indicators are based on prior knowledge and knowledge gained through working with 
this thesis, for example by developing the system description in figure 9. 
Failure mode  Possible indicator  
No signal from one 
SEM 
 
1. Use the alarm signal the SCU give if requested data is not 
received. 
2. Compare current reading to the reading one hour ago to see 
if it is continuously being updated for at least one sensor in 
each of the different parts of each SEM unit. 
No signal from 
multiple SEMs  
 
1. Use the alarm signal the SCU give if requested data is not 
received. 
2. Compare current reading to the reading one hour ago to see 
if it is continuously being updated for at least one sensor in 
each of the different parts of each SEM unit. 
Failures in the 
electrical power 
supply 
 
3. Check power supply for each SEM-unit for failures by 
comparing reading to upper and lower operational limit. 
 
4. Check power supply for each line in the SPCU for failures 
by comparing reading to upper and lower operational limit. 
Table 7: Failure modes and possible indicators for the category Communication. 
The indicators are evaluated in a checklist, see Appendix B, table 17, for details. Based on the 
results in this checklist, a combination of indicator 2 and 3 is selected for further 
development. These indicators may be combined because they use the same input signal. This 
indicator will hereafter be referred to as the “communication indicator”. The indicator is 
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meant to indicate the condition of the communication for each well by checking the 
communication with each of the two SEMs that communicate with the SPCU on GFC. The 
indicator will compare the supply voltage for each of the two SEMs to the same signal some 
time ago and to the operational limits for supply voltage. In this way both the communication 
with each SEM and problems with power supply can be checked. For the N-well only the 
SEM temperature and not the supply voltage is available for both SEMs. The indicator for this 
well would be set up in the same way, but will not indicate problems with power supply 
unless power fails and the SEM would stop sending signals. 
By comparing the supply voltage for each SEM-unit the communication with each SEM unit 
can be checked. If upper and lower operational limits are included the same indicator can also 
indicate problems with power supply. Two problems with this indicator are that failure in the 
voltage sensor will be indicated as communication failure and it can only indicate SEM failures 
that affect the voltage sensor.  
 
A rough estimate based on the analysed records shows that such an indicator could indicate 
about 70% of all reported failures related to communication. 
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5.2. Hydraulics 
This category covers all reports of failures in the subsea hydraulic system, and topside failures 
that has the potential to disrupt supply.  
 
System description 
The hydraulic system’s function is to enable the control system to operate the subsea valves. 
This is done by supplying the different subsea actuators with hydraulic fluid with sufficient 
volume and pressure, without leaks. The system has both a HP and a LP part. These parts of the 
system are functionally equivalent and therefore the simplified illustration shown in figure 10 
is valid for both.  
 
Figure 10: A simplified illustration of relevant components for the category hydraulics. 
The hydraulic power unit (HPU) is the main part of the topside system. It consists of a reservoir 
supplying two pumps that are protected against overpressure by PSVs. To control the supply 
pressure there are pressure control valves and pressure transmitters controlling start and stop of 
the pumps. The hydraulic fluid is distributed to the individual SCMs through two identical 
distribution systems for redundancy. Inside the SCM there are transmitters measuring both the 
supply pressure and flow. The hydraulic supply is distributed to each of the directional control 
valves through a supply manifold. The directional control valves distribute pressure to the valve 
actuators if a valve changes position. The hydraulics returning from the valve actuators are 
commingled in the return manifold and are discharged to the sea. This type of hydraulic system 
is known as an open system, i.e. no return system. This requires an environmentally friendly 
fluid and a flowmeter that measures the discharged amount. 
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Development of indicators  
Based on the findings in the analysis for the hydraulic related reports there is a need for 
indicators detecting the following failure modes: 
 Internal leaks in valves topside 
 Unstable or low hydraulic supply pressure  
 External leakage subsea 
 Internal leakage in the SCM 
 
For each of these failure modes, one or two possible indicators are suggested in table 8. Possible 
indicators are based on prior knowledge and knowledge gained through working with this 
thesis, for example by developing the system description in figure 10. 
Failure mode  Possible indicator  
Internal leaks in valves 
topside 
1. Number of pump starts versus valve operations subsea. 
2. Number of pump starts versus accumulated return flow 
subsea. 
Unstable or low 
hydraulic supply 
pressure 
 
3. Detecting low distribution pressure from the HPU by 
comparing pressure reading to operational limits. 
4. Detecting low supply pressure in SCM by comparing 
pressure reading to operational limits. 
External leakage 
subsea 
5. Changes in reservoir level versus valve operations subsea. 
1. Number of pump starts versus valve operations subsea. 
Internal leakage in the 
SCM 
5. Changes in reservoir level versus valve operations subsea. 
1. Number of pump starts versus valve operations subsea. 
Table 8: Failure modes and possible indicators for the category Hydraulics. 
The indicators are evaluated in a checklist, see Appendix B, table 18, for details. Based on the 
results in this checklist, indicator 1 is selected for further development, hereafter referred to as 
the hydraulics indicator. This indicator would calculate the number of pump starts and valve 
operations and compare the numbers. If the pumps start multiple times without valve 
operations, it is an indication of a leakage somewhere in the system. An indicator showing 
number of pump starts versus valve operations can monitor all failure modes in table 8 except 
unstable of low hydraulic supply pressure. The main weakness is that it is difficult to detect 
leaks when valves subsea are operated. The indicator would therefore work better when the 
valves are not operated. 
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A rough estimate based on the analyzed records shows that such an indicator could indicate 
about 90% of all reported failures related to hydraulics.  
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5.3. Sensors 
This category covers all reports related to failures in only one sensor regardless of cause.  
 
System description 
The system description in figure 11 is a simplified description of the principles of two typical 
sensors that are covered by this category. The first sensor is a pressure sensor (PT) mounted on 
the XT between the PMV and PWV. The reading from this sensor is referred to as the wellhead 
pressure. The sensor measures the pressure and converts it to a signal that is transmitted to the 
SCM through connections in the SCM mounting base. Within the SCM the signal is sent to 
both SEM units for processing.  
 
Figure 11: A simplified overview of the relevant equipment for the category Sensors. 
The second sensor is a pressure sensor mounted inside the SCM. This sensor measures the 
hydraulic supply pressure and converts it to a signal that is transmitted to both SEMs for 
processing. Both SEMs receive signal from all the sensors, but signals are only transmitted 
upon request from the SCU topside.  
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Development of indicators  
Based on the findings in the analysis for the sensor related reports there is a need for indicators 
detecting the following failure modes: 
        No signal from one sensor 
 Incorrect reading/value 
        Out of range reading/value 
 Unstable signal 
 
For each of these failure modes, one or two possible indicators will be suggested in table 9. 
Possible indicators are based on prior knowledge and knowledge gained through working with 
this thesis, for example by developing the system description in figure 11. 
Failure mode  Possible indicator  
No signal from one 
sensor 
1. Compare current reading with the reading some time 
ago. 
Incorrect value 
 
2. Compare sensor value to the upper and lower 
operational limits. 
3. Compare reading to readings from other sensors in same 
system. 
Out of range value 
 
2. Comparing sensor value to the upper and lower 
operational limits. 
3. Compare reading to readings from other sensors in same 
system. 
4. Compare sensor values to upper and lower range limits. 
Unstable signal 1. Compare current reading with the reading some time 
ago. 
Table 9: Failure modes and possible indicators for the category Sensors. 
 
The indicators are evaluated in a checklist, see Appendix B, table 19, for details. Based on the 
results in this checklist, a combination of indicators 1 and 4 is selected for further development, 
hereafter referred to as the “sensor indicator”.  This indicator would compare the current sensor 
reading to the range limits and the sensor signal some time ago. If the readings are outside the 
range or completely stable this is an indication of a failure in the sensor. There are several 
sensors on each well. By performing the process for each sensor, the total number of failed 
sensors for that well can be found.  
A rough estimate based on the analysed records show that such an indicator could indicate about 
60% of all reported failures related to sensors.  
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5.4. Downhole gauges  
This category covers all reports of failures in the communications with the downhole gauges.  
 
System description  
Downhole pressure and temperature gauges are installed as part of the completion of a well. 
These gauges measure pressure and temperature inside the tubing and send the electrical signals 
to the wellhead. The signal cables are mounted on the outside of the tubing and connected to a 
penetrator that is part of the XT. As shown in figure 12, the only difference between the systems 
for the L- and M-wells and N-wells are the electrical control module (ISEM). For L- and M-
wells the signals from the penetrator are transmitted directly to the SCM. The signals are 
distributed to the two SEMs for processing and transmission to GFC. 
 
Figure 12: A simplified overview of the relevant equipment for the category Downhole gauges. 
For the N-wells the signal from the penetrator connects to ISEM for control of downhole 
equipment. The unit process the signals from the downhole gauges before transmitting the 
signals to the SCM. From the SCM the signals are transmitted to GFC. 
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Development of indicators 
Based on the reports related to downhole gauges there is a need for indicators that can detect 
the following failure modes: 
 No signal from one downhole gauge 
 No signal from all downhole gauges in one well 
 Value out of range. 
 Unstable signal. 
 
For each of these failure modes, one or two possible indicators will be suggested in table 10. 
Possible indicators are based on prior knowledge and knowledge gained through working with 
this thesis, for example by developing the system description in figure 12. 
Failure mode  Possible indicator  
No signal from one 
downhole gauge 
1. Compare current reading with the reading some time 
ago. 
No signal from all 
downhole gauges in one 
well 
1. Compare current reading with the reading some time 
ago. 
Value out of range. 2. Comparing sensor value to the upper and lower range 
limits. 
Unstable signal. 1. Compare current reading with the reading some time 
ago. 
2. Comparing sensor value to the upper and lower range 
limits. 
Table 10: Failure modes and possible indicators for the category Downhole gauges. 
The indicators are evaluated in a checklist, see Appendix B, table 20, for details. Based on the 
results in this checklist, a combination of indicators 1 and 2 is selected for further development, 
hereafter referred to as the downhole gauge indicator. This indicator would compare the current 
gauge reading to the range limits and the gauge signal some time ago. If the readings are outside 
the range or completely stable this is an indication of a failure in the gauges. Some wells have 
several gauges. By performing the process for each gauge, the total number of failed gauges 
can be found.  
 
This indicator if working according to plan could indicate about 95% of the failures reported in 
the analyzed GFCSAT-reports classified within the downhole gauges category. 
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5.5. Multiphase flow meter 
This category covers all reports of problems related to the multiphase flow meter.  
 
System description 
Multiphase flow meters (MFM) are an integrated part of the flow control modules (FCM) for 
SRI wells. The MFM is located upstream of the choke valve in the well stream flowloop of the 
FCM. The raw signals from the MFM is sent to the SCM through cables connected to the top 
of the SCM. The SCM module transmits the signals to the SPCU topside. 
 
Figure 13: A simplified overview of the relevant equipment for the category Multiphase flow meter. 
The calculations needed for finding the flow of all three phases are conducted in the SPCU unit 
topside.  
Development of indicators  
Based on the findings in the analysis of multiphase flow meter related reports there is a need 
for indicators detecting the following failure modes: 
 No signal from one multiphase flow meter 
 No signal from multiple multiphase flow meters 
 Incorrect reading 
 
For each of these failure modes, one or two possible indicators will be suggested in table 11. 
Possible indicators are based on prior knowledge and knowledge gained through working with 
this thesis, for example by developing the system description in figure 13.  
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Failure mode  Possible indicator  
No signal from one 
multiphase flow meter 
 
1. Compare current reading with the reading some time ago. 
No signal from 
multiple multiphase 
flow meters 
 
1. Compare current reading with the reading some time ago. 
Incorrect values 2. Compare reading to average production last 24 hours. 
3. Compare reading to predefined limits 
Table 11: Failure modes and possible indicators for the category Multiphase flow meter. 
The indicators are evaluated in a checklist, see Appendix B, table 21, for details. Based on the 
results in this checklist, a combination of indicators 1 and 3 is selected for further development, 
hereafter referred to as the multiphase flow meter indicator.  This indicator would compare the 
current MFM reading to the predefined limits and the MFM-signal some time ago. If the 
readings are outside the predefined limits or completely stable this is an indication of a failure 
in the MFM.  
If working according to plan, this indicator could indicate about 90% of the failures reported in 
the analyzed GFCSAT-reports in the multiphase flowmeter category. 
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5.6. External leaks  
This category covers all reports of external leaks of both hydrocarbon and all utility mediums, 
with the exception of hydraulic fluids and annulus related leaks that are covered in other 
categories.  
 
System description  
A simplified system of a well stream is illustrated in figure 14 and described below. Detection 
of leaks can in prinsiple be done in a similar way for other systems. 
 
Figure 14: A simplified overview of the relevant equipment for the category External leaks. 
Hydrocarbon leak detectors are installed on each XT as a part of the FCM. These detectors 
should indicate hydrocarbon leaks from XT and associated equipment. Large leaks can also be 
detected by pressure sensors in the system, illustrated by a pressure transmitter measuring the 
pressure downstream of the PWV in figure 14.  
 
Development of indicators  
Based on the reports related to external leaks there is a need for indicators that can detect the 
following failure modes: 
 External leakage of hydrocarbons 
 External leakage of utility medium 
 
For each of these failure modes, one or two possible indicators will be suggested in table 12. 
Possible indicators are based on prior knowledge and knowledge gained through working with 
this thesis, for example by developing the system description in figure 14. 
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Failure mode  Possible indicator  
External leakage of 
hydrocarbons 
1. Significant pressure drop in the system 
2. HC-leak detector  
External leakage of 
utility medium  
1. Significant pressure drop in the system 
 
Table 12: Failure modes and possible indicators for the category External leaks. 
The indicators are evaluated in a checklist, see Appendix B, table 22, for details. The evaluation 
shows that the readings from the HC-leak detector is unavailable for excel. The only possible 
indicator for external leaks is therefore an indicator that indicate leakage when there is a 
significant pressure drop in the system of interest. However, a significant pressure drop can 
only be caused by a large leakage. Large leaks require immediate action and are therefore of 
little interest for the development of indicators for a subsea management program, which main 
function is periodically, not continually, monitoring. Consequently, there are no applicable 
indicators for this category.  
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5.7. Annulus 
All reports related to fluids leaking in or out of the production annulus is covered by this 
category. 
 
System description  
The production annulus is the space between the production tubing and the production casing. 
The space is filled with completion fluid during completion of the well. For pressure control, 
the production annulus is connected to the annulus bleed system. This system allows for 
bleeding access pressure to flare or drain system on board GFC.  
 
Figure 15: A simplified overview of the relevant equipment for the category Annulus. 
Pressure changes in the production annulus can result from temperature changes or leaks. The 
annulus bleed system is also connected to the production line and to the sealed compartment on 
top of the XT. The main valves and pressure transmitter in the system are shown in figure 15. 
Under normal operations, the AWV, WOV and XOV valves would be closed, sealing the 
production annulus. The AMV would be open to allow for monitoring of the pressure.  
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Development of indicators 
Based on the result for the analysis of annulus related reports there is a need for an indicator 
that can detect the following failure modes: 
 Pressure build up in the annulus 
 Small pressure drops in the annulus 
 
Both of these failure modes can only be detected during normal operations when the annulus is 
sealed off and monitored by pressure transmitters. All indicators must therefore include some 
algorithm that only triggers failure indication when the valves are in normal position.  
For each of these failure modes, one or two possible indicators will be suggested in table 13. 
Possible indicators are based on prior knowledge and knowledge gained through working with 
this thesis, for example by developing the system description in figure 15. 
Failure mode  Possible indicator  
Pressure buildup in the 
annulus 
1. Comparing annulus pressure (PT1 and PT2 in figure 15) to 
predefined high pressure alarm limits.  
2. Comparing annulus pressure to the same pressure some 
time ago to indicate if the pressure has changed. 
Small pressure drops in 
the annulus 
2. Comparing annulus pressure to the same pressure some 
time ago to indicate if the pressure has changed. 
Table 13: Failure modes and possible indicators for the category Annulus. 
The indicators are evaluated in a checklist, see Appendix B, table 23, for details. Based on the 
results in this checklist, a combination of indicators 1 and 2 is selected for further development, 
hereafter referred to as the annulus indicator. This indicator would compare the current annulus 
reading to the predefined limits and the annulus-signal some time ago. If the readings are 
outside the predefined limits or completely stable this is an indication of a failure in the MFM.  
 
This indicator, if working according to plan, could indicate about 90% of the failures reported 
in the analyzed GFCSAT-reports in the multiphase flowmeter category. 
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5.8. Choke 
This category covers all problems that are related to the choke valves subsea. 
 
System description 
The choke valve is the main component in the FCM. The FCM is essentially a flow loop for the 
well steam between the XT and the manifold module. The choke valve is a control valve with 
position indication (CP) that regulates and controls the well steam. The flow control module 
also contains a number of sensors. The most important ones for development of indicators are 
included in the system illustration in figure 16.     
 
Figure 16: A simplified overview of the relevant equipment for the category Choke. 
Pressure and temperature transmitters are installed both up stream and down stream of the choke 
valve. MFMs are only included on the five N-wells. All sensors in the FCM are connected to 
the SCM by jumpers connected to the top of the SCM.  
The well stream from the FCM flows into the manifold module where it commingle with other 
wells streams before the flowlines lead it to Gullfaks C. Topside on GFC the commingled well 
streams is controlled by an additional choke valve before entering the processing facility.  
 
Development of indicators  
Based on the findings in the analysis of choke related reports there is need for indicators 
detecting the following failure modes: 
 Mismatch between flow and reported position 
 Abrasion of the choke valve interior. 
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The difference between this failure modes is the rate of the change. Sudden changes must be 
related to the position indicator or sudden damages to the valve. A mismatch can develop over 
time and be caused by abrasion in the valve. 
For each of these failure modes, one or two possible indicators will be suggested in table 14. 
Possible indicators are based on prior knowledge and knowledge gained through working with 
this thesis, for example by developing the system description in figure 16. 
Failure mode  Possible indicator  
Mismatch between 
flow and reported 
position 
 
1. Comparing ratio between choke position (CP) and flow 
measurement(MFM) to ratio some time ago.* 
2. Comparing ratio between choke position and pressure 
differential (differential between PT1 and PT2) to ratio some 
time ago.* 
Abrasion of the choke 
valve interior. 
3. Measuring flow coefficient of the choke 
Table 14: Failure modes and possible indicators for the category Choke. 
*If there is significant change to the ratio it can indicate choke failure. 
 
The indicators are evaluated in a checklist, see Appendix B, table 24, for details. Based on the 
results in this checklist, indicator 1 is selected for further development, hereafter referred to as 
the choke indicator. This indicator compares the ratio between pressure differential and choke 
position to the ration some time ago. If the mismatch is larger than a predefined limit, it indicates 
failure.  
 
This indicator if working according to plan could indicate about 60% of the failures reported in 
the analyzed GFCSAT-reports in the choke category.  
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5.9. Key condition indicators  
In the previous 8 subchapters one indicator for each of the 8 categories relevant for selecting 
indicators have been found. To select key condition indicators from this list of 8 selected 
indicators all relevant information must be considered. The relevant information is retrieved 
from both chapter 4 and the previous 8 subchapters, and is presented in table 15. 
Category 
 
GFCSAT-analysis Development 
of indicators 
Total % Trend  Quality  
Communication 27,5 ↗ 70% 
Hydraulics 9,0 - 90% 
Sensors 8,7 ↘ 60% 
Downhole gauges  7,5 ↘ 95% 
Multiphase meter 6,7 ↓ 90% 
External leaks  5,2 ↓ 0% 
Annulus 3,2 ↑ 90% 
Choke 1,7 - 60% 
Table 15: Summary of relevant information for developing indicators. 
Total % represents points each category received from the combined analysis, divided by total 
points. For categories with a trend towards fewer or more failures, a straight arrow is used. For 
categories with a tendency, inclined arrows are used. Quality gives information of the 
percentage of reported failures the selected indicator for that category would detect if working 
according to plan.  
Based on the data presented in table 15, communication, hydraulics, sensors, downhole gauges 
and multiphase meter are the obvious key categories.  
 
The indicators for these key categories are to work as follows: 
 
Communication indicator  
This indicator indicates the condition of the communication for each well by checking the 
communication with each of the two SEMs that communicate with the SPCU on GFC. The 
indicator is to comparing the supply voltage for each of the two SEMs to the same signal some 
time ago and to the operational limits for supply voltage. In this way both the communication 
with each SEM and problems with power supply can be checked. For the N-well only the SEM 
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temperature and not the supply voltage is available for both SEMs. The indicator for these well 
would be set up in the same way will not indicate problems with power supply. (Unless power 
fails and the SEM would stop sending) 
Hydraulics indicator 
This indicator would calculate the number of pump starts and valve operations and compare the 
numbers. If the pump starts multiple times without valve operations, it is an indication of a 
leakage somewhere in the system. 
Sensor indicator 
This indicator would compare the current sensor reading to the range limits and the sensor 
signal some time ago. If the readings are outside the range or completely stable this is an 
indication of a failure in the sensor. There are several sensors on each well. By performing the 
process for each sensor, the total number of failed sensors for that well can be found. 
Downhole gauge indicator 
This indicator would compare the current gauge reading to the range limits and the gauge signal 
some time ago. If the readings are outside range or completely stable this is an indication of a 
failure in the gauges. Some wells have several gauges. By performing the process for each 
gauge, the total number of failed gauges can be found. 
Multiphase flow meter indicator 
This indicator would compare the current MFM reading to the predefined limits and the MFM-
signal some time ago. If the readings are outside the predefined limits or completely stable this 
is an indication of a failure in the MFM. 
5.10. Test of key condition indicators 
The indicators were initially developed to be a part of a subsea management prototype. This 
prototype has not been developed as part of the thesis. The indicators have, however, been 
tested with promising results.  
All the well specific indicators indicate failure if a signal is stable or out of range. When a 
sensor does not send new signals, the last known value will be shown. This means that a stable 
signal is an indication of lack of new updates, i.e. a failure on a sensor or the communication.   
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In a test of the well specific indicators, the number of failures were known in advance. All 
known failures the indicators should detect on the L, M and N templates were detected, with 
two exceptions. One downhole gauge that was reported to have failed did not indicate failure. 
By checking the CCR control system, the gauge readings were moving within range, i.e. it is 
uncertain why this gauge was reported as failed.  The second exception was an erroneous 
indication of failure in a SEM in one of the N-wells. The most likely cause is that the stable 
temperature in the SEM caused an erroneous indication of failure. The indicator interprets the 
stable signal as no signal. Another and less likely cause is that a new and previously unknown 
failure was detected. If this is the case, the most likely cause is a failure in the temperature 
sensor in the SEM since the communication status showed no signs of failure.  
These two possibilities for erroneous indication of SEM failure illustrate two weaknesses for 
the SEM communication indicator. Primarily, the indicator is dependent on signals that do not 
have a stable value. For the N-wells, the only signal available in excel for both SEMs is the 
SEM temperature. The relatively stable SEM temperature is not ideal for the purpose, since a 
stable signal is interpreted as a failure. To compensate, the signals could be checked for stability 
with comparing current value to values retrieved for four or five different times, instead of three 
different times as used in the indicators. See figure 18 for details about the formulas used in the 
indicators. This source of erroneous indication is also valid for the sensor, downhole gauge and 
multiphase flow meter indicators, but less likely for the other, less stable parameters. The 
second weakness is that any failure affecting the signal from the temperature sensor will be 
indicated as a SEM failure. These weaknesses are also valid for the communication indicators 
for the L and M wells, where the only signal available for both SEMs is supply voltage. Further 
troubleshooting should be performed in order to find the reason for the detected failures.  
Based on the result of the test, the well specific indicators work fairly well to detect failure. By 
structuring the indicators into an interface as suggested in figure 17, they can be helpful in both 
detecting new failures and keeping track of existing failures. 
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6. Discussion 
As part of this thesis, all relevant goals and objectives for GFCSAT have been reviewed to 
ensure that the chosen indicators are according to, and can help to achieve, these goals. The 
chosen goals are essential for the analysis and consequently also for the indicators chosen. 
This suggests that the indicators are specific for GFCSAT only. The final goals in this thesis 
are, however, general goals for the subsea industry. Since the goals are general, they should 
be applicable for other subsea fields as well. 
The goals have led to the analysis of three different types of reports. These different reports 
are in turn combined into one common record for analysis. By this approach, the goals are not 
weighted equally in the selection process. The uneven weighting results in OPEX-costs 
dominating the analysis and in turn the indicators. PE is poorly represented due to few reports. 
Even though the PE-loss reports represent a shorter time period, the low number of reports 
indicates that this goal does not have as much room for improvement as the other goals. It can 
therefore be argued that by this approach the goals with the most room for improvement will 
be the one dominating the indicators. I.e. if the number of PE-losses increases, this goal could 
increase its importance. Another option would be to treat the three goals equally. This would 
have put a disproportionate weighting on the few PE-losses compared to the many 
malfunction reports, and could in turn have reduced the predictive value of the developed 
indicators. 
The analysis process with non fixed categories and different type of reports containing 
somewhat different data, it was not always obvious which category a report should be 
categorized as. The evaluation was based on the writers limited experience and is therefore to 
some extent subjective. Some of these issues are summarized in the next two paragraphs.   
The same failure may appear in different reports and several times for the same type of reports. 
When it appeared several times in the same type of reports, the duplicated report was discarded. 
It is however likely that not all duplicated reports are found. When the same failure is found in 
different type of reports, they are included in the analysis. This may add emphasis on some 
failures, for example is this the case for all failures in the category external leaks. These are 
included in both malfunction and synergi reports. This is not considered to be duplicated 
reporting, only to add emphasis on important failures. These types of failures are deemed to be 
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important because they cover different types of failure reports. For example, a failure reported 
in a malfunction report that also results in a PE loss report (OPEX as well as PE loss), will most 
likely be more important than one that only appears as a failure in the malfunction report (only 
OPEX). 
When reports of similar failures are found during a short time interval, they are treated as 
duplicates. When several days separate the reports of similar failures, they are not considered 
to be duplicates. The same underlying failure may however cause several reports over a longer 
period of time. It can be argued that these types of reports add too much emphasis on some 
categories, which in turn could affect the chosen indicators. However, for these types of failures, 
it may be more important to oversee their function, and an indicator might thus be justified. 
Therefore it is not assumed to affect the analysis results negatively that these types of failures 
are not discarded. 
The final results are very clear (see table 15 page 75), and therefore only large differences in 
the method used for analyzing data would result in different key condition indicators. 
The analysis of categories was subjective. No experts have been used for categorizing, and 
incidents have not been studied in detail. Only descriptions found in the incident reports were 
used. However, the findings are well in accordance with OREDA. 
 
The possible indicator for each of the failure modes was primarily based on system reviews and 
the knowledge acquired through working with this thesis. It is therefore a possibility that some 
information could have been missed. This could in turn have affected the evaluation. However, 
the promising results for the indicator test show that the selected key indicators are useful and 
have value-adding qualities.  
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6.1. Further work 
6.1.1. Excel prototype 
The indicators are developed to be implemented as a part of an excel prototype of a subsea 
management program. Although the development of the program has not been a part of the 
thesis, some considerations regarding the development of such a program have been prepared. 
First and foremost, the program must have an interface providing the indicators a well-
structured and intuitive way to get a quick overview of the condition of the wells. 
Important information can be included in the prototype, such as whether the well is in 
production or not, and the production volume. This information adds context to the results from 
the indicators. For example, if there are detected problems with communication on a high 
production well, this could be more critical than if the same is indicated for a well that is not in 
production. 
If an indicator indicates a failure, the prototype must be built in such a way that it may easily 
be understood why a failure is indicated, but the actual troubleshooting should be conducted in 
the more detailed systems. 
 
Figure 17: Illustration of a possible set up for the GFCSAT prototype in excel 
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Figure 18: Illustration of how the SEM-communication indicator could be set up in excel. 
 
6.1.2. Further development of the subsea management system 
The full purpose of the program is not evident when it is only applied to some 13 subsea wells. 
The time saved when using the indicators developed and the suggested prototype compared to 
viewing more detailed systems for only 13 wells is limited. Similar indicators must therefore 
be developed for more wells. An obvious first step would be to add the Gullfaks Satellite wells 
tied back to Gullfaks A. Since the equipment is more or less the same for the Gullfaks Satellite 
wells, the key indicators will most likely be similar or could even to some extent be based on 
the findings in this thesis. This could also be the case for other fields with similar equipment. 
By applying these indicators for subsea fields with several wells, the time saved can be 
substantial. This is useful in a streamline industry. 
When applied to fields with many wells, and to multiple fields, it may be useful to apply the 
program as an analysis tool. For example, it can be used to get an overview of number of wells 
with reduced redundancy for SEMs on multiple fields, or to analyze the development of failures 
over time. 
On the other hand, the program can be extended by adding more detailed indicators. Extensive 
development in this direction may not be as useful, due to more detailed tools that are already 
in place. 
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7. Conclusion 
Based on the analysis and indicator development process the key condition indicators are found 
to be the indicators within the categories communication, hydraulics, sensors, downhole gauges 
and multiphase meter. The hydraulics-indicator is a system indicator aimed at detecting leaks. 
The other four indicators are well specific and are all aimed at detecting the failure modes no 
signal and out of range signal for the equipment within the respective categories.    
 
These key condition indicators are all for monitoring the control system. This is in accordance 
with OREDA data for subsea where the equipment class Control systems had the highest failure 
rates by far.  
 
The testing of the indicators shows promising results with only two possibly erroneous 
indications. Based on this test the indicators should be applicable for use in a  prototype program 
for GFCSAT, and can provide valuable input for future development of a mid-level conditional 
monitoring and operational management program. 
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9. Appendices 
9.1. Appendix A 
The format of the spreadsheets used for analyzing and systemizing reports is shown in table 16, 
Short description of each column is provided in the list below the table.  
ID number Date Severity Description Equipment Category  Comments 
       
       
Table 16: Spread sheet for systemizing reports. 
 ID number for identification. The original report numbers were used when possible.  
 Date for looking at trends and identifying possible duplicated reporting. 
 Severity, when the reports have a severity classification this is used to highlight the 
reports that are of most importance to achieving the goal. Not all reports have such a 
severity classification. 
 Description or title, usually the original title of the report unless it is misleading or ill 
fitted for the purpose. 
 Equipment describes which equipment failed or was involved. Usually simple 
descriptions of items/units. E.g. SCM. 
 Category is used for categorizing the reports.  
 Comments include a short description of available information that is not in any of the 
other columns.  
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9.2. Appendix B 
 
Category: Communication 
Possible indicator 1 
Use the alarm signal the SCU give if requested data is not received. 
Question  Answer  
Which failure mode can this indicator 
detect? 
No signal from one SEM and  
No signal from multiple SEMs  
Is all required data available in excel: No, signal is only available for some wells 
Is similar monitoring in place already: Yes, CCR has the same alarm 
Sources of erroneous indication: - 
Comment: Not applicable for all wells 
Possible indicator 2 
Compare current reading to the reading one hour ago to see if it is continuously being 
updated for at least one sensor in each of the different parts of each SEM unit. 
Which failure mode can this indicator 
detect? 
No signal from one SEM and  
No signal from multiple SEMs 
Is all required data available in excel: No, only signal for SEM supply voltage is 
available for both SEMs on L and M wells. For N-
wells, only signal for SEM temperature is 
available for both SEMs 
Is similar monitoring in place already: No, only alarm for not receiving requested data 
Sources of erroneous indication: - 
Comment: Can only detect failures that affect the sensor for 
supply voltage 
Possible indicator 3:  
Check power supply for each SEM-unit for failures by comparing reading to upper and 
lower operational limit. 
Which failure mode can this indicator 
detect? 
Failures in the electrical power supply 
 
Is all required data available in excel: Yes, voltage for each SEM is available 
Is similar monitoring in place already: Yes, CCR high and low alarms for SEM raw 
voltage  
Sources of erroneous indication: -  
Comment: -  
Possible indicator 4: 
Check power supply for each line in the SPCU for failures by comparing reading to upper 
and lower operational limit 
Which failure mode can this indicator 
detect? 
Failures in the electrical power supply 
 
Is all required data available in excel: Yes, voltage for each power supply line 
Is similar monitoring in place: Yes, CCR high and low alarms voltage for each 
power supply line 
Sources of erroneous indication: -  
Comment: -  
Table 17: Development of the Communication indicator. 
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Category: Hydraulics 
Possible indicator 1  
Number of pump starts versus valve operations subsea. 
Question Answer 
Which failure mode can this indicator 
detect? 
Internal leaks in valves topside,  
External leakage subsea and  
Internal leakage in the SCM 
Is all required data available in excel: Yes, all position signals for valves and pump-
running signal is available. No accumulated 
numbers for valve operations nor pump starts.  
Is similar monitoring in place: No 
Sources of erroneous indication: Can not indicate leakage if subsea valves are 
operated.  
Comment: To compare pump starts and valve operations 
algorithm for retrieving accumulated numbers 
must be found.  
Possible indicator 2 
Number of pump starts versus accumulated return flow subsea. 
Which failure mode can this indicator 
detect? 
Internal leaks in valves topside 
Is all required data available in excel: Yes, all pump-running signals and accumulated 
return flow are available. No accumulated 
numbers for pump starts. 
Is similar monitoring in place: No 
Sources of erroneous indication: Can not indicate leakage if subsea valves are 
operated. 
Comment: Algorithm for retrieving accumulated numbers of 
pump starts must be developed 
Possible indicator 3 
Detecting low distribution pressure from the HPU by comparing pressure reading to 
operational limits. 
Which failure mode can this indicator 
detect? 
Unstable or low hydraulic supply pressure 
 
Is all required data available in excel: Yes, distribution pressure from the HPU is 
available 
Is similar monitoring in place: Yes, CCR has alarms for both high and low 
distribution pressure from the HPU 
Sources of erroneous indication: -   
Comment: -  
Possible indicator 4 
Detecting low supply pressure in SCM by comparing pressure reading to operational limits. 
Which failure mode can this indicator 
detect? 
Unstable or low hydraulic supply pressure 
 
Is all required data available in excel: Yes. 
Is similar monitoring in place: Yes, CCR has alarms for both high and low 
supply pressure to the SCMs 
Sources of erroneous indication: - 
Comments: - 
Possible indicator 5 
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Changes in reservoir level  versus valve operations subsea. 
Which failure mode can this indicator 
detect? 
External leakage subsea and Internal leakage in 
the SCM 
Is all required data available in excel: Yes, all position signals for valves and reservoir 
level is available. No accumulated numbers for 
valve operations. 
Is similar monitoring in place: No, only alarm for low reservoir level. 
Sources of erroneous indication: -  
Comments: -  
Table 18: Development of the Hydraulics indicator. 
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Category: Sensor  
Possible indicator 1  
Compare current reading with the reading some time ago. 
Question Answer 
Which failure mode can this indicator 
detect? 
No signal from one sensor and  
Unstable signal 
Is all required data available in excel: Yes, all important sensor signals are available. 
Is similar monitoring in place: No, only communication failure alarms. 
Sources of erroneous indication: - 
Comments: Only applicable if no signal is received over some 
time. 
Possible indicator 2 
Compare sensor value to the upper and lower operational limits. 
Which failure mode can this indicator 
detect? 
Incorrect value and  
Out of range value 
Is all required data available in excel: Yes, all important sensor signals are available. 
Is similar monitoring in place: Some sensors have alarms for upper and/or lower 
operational limits when it is of importance for 
operation of the subsea production system.  
Sources of erroneous indication: High and low process values will be indicated as 
sensor failures. E.g. under shut down of a well.  
Comments:  
Possible indicator 3 
Compare reading to readings from other sensors in same system. 
Which failure mode can this indicator 
detect? 
Incorrect value and  
Out of range value 
Is all required data available in excel: Yes, all important sensor signal are available. 
Is similar monitoring in place: No alarms for deviation for sensor values are in 
place 
Sources of erroneous indication: - 
Comments: Limited application, only a few places have two 
sensors that can be compared. 
Possible indicator 4 
Compare sensor values to upper and lower range limits. 
Which failure mode can this indicator 
detect? 
Out of range value 
Is all required data available in excel: Yes, all important sensor signal are available and 
range limits are available in single list 
Is similar monitoring in place: Some sensors have alarms for upper and/or lower 
operational limit when it is of importance for 
operation of the subsea production system. 
Sources of erroneous indication: - 
Comments: - 
Table 19: Development of the Sensor indicator. 
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Category: Downhole gauges 
Possible indicator 1  
Compare current reading with the reading some time ago. 
Question Answer 
Which failure mode can this 
indicator detect? 
No signal from one downhole gauge and  
No signal from all downhole gauges in one well and 
Unstable signal 
Is all required data available in excel: Yes, signal form all downhole gauges are available. 
Is similar monitoring in place: No alarms for downhole gauges. 
Sources of erroneous indication: -  
Comment -  
Possible indicator 2 
Comparing sensor value to the upper and lower range limit. 
Which failure mode can this 
indicator detect? 
Value out of range and 
Unstable signal 
Is all required data available in excel: Yes, signal from all downhole gauges are available. 
Is similar monitoring in place: No alarms for downhole gauges. 
Sources of erroneous indication: -  
Comment -  
Table 20: Development of the Downhole gauges indicator. 
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Category: Multiphase flow meter 
Possible indicator 1  
Compare current reading with the reading some time ago 
Question Answer 
Which failure mode can this indicator 
detect? 
No signal from one MFM and  
No signal from multiple MFMs 
Is all required data available in excel: Yes, signal from MFM is available. 
Is similar monitoring in place: No 
Sources of erroneous indication: -  
Comment  
Possible indicator 2 
Compare reading to average production last 24 hours. 
Which failure mode can this indicator 
detect? 
Incorrect values 
Is all required data available in excel: Yes, both signals are available. 
Is similar monitoring in place: No 
Sources of erroneous indication: Can indicate failure whenever the production is 
not stable.  
Comment Will give to many erroneous indications of failure.  
Possible indicator 3 
Compare reading to predefined limits 
Which failure mode can this indicator 
detect? 
Incorrect values 
Is all required data available in excel Yes, signal from MFM is available. 
Is similar monitoring in place: No 
Sources of erroneous indication: Will indicate failure when the production is shut 
down or reduced if it is not linked to opening 
signal for relevant valves.   
Comment Must be linked to valve signals. 
Table 21: Development of the Multiphase flow meter indicator. 
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Category: External leaks 
Possible indicator 1  
Significant pressure drop in the system 
Question Answer 
Which failure mode can this indicator 
detect? 
External leakage of hydrocarbons and  
External leakage of utility medium 
Is all required data available in excel: Yes, relevant pressure transmitters are available. 
Is similar monitoring in place: Yes, alarms for significant pressure drops are in 
place. 
Sources of erroneous indication: Shut down of a well can be indicated as a leakage 
Comment Can only indicate large leaks.   
Possible indicator 2 
Hydrocarbon-leak detector 
Which failure mode can this indicator 
detect? 
External leakage of hydrocarbons 
Is all required data available in excel: No, the hydrocarbon leak detector is not available. 
Is similar monitoring in place: Yes. 
Sources of erroneous indication: Some hydrocarbon detectors can indicate leaks 
erroneously. 
Comment  
Table 22: Development of the External leaks indicator. 
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Category: Annulus 
Possible indicator 1  
Comparing annulus pressure to predefined high pressure alarm limits   
Question Answer 
Which failure mode can this indicator 
detect? 
Pressure buildup in the annulus 
Is all required data available in excel: Yes, annulus pressure sensors signals are 
available. 
Is similar monitoring in place: Yes, CCR have alarm for high annulus pressure. 
Sources of erroneous indication: - 
Comment Can only indicate pressure buildup that exceeds 
the high limit.  
Possible indicator 2 
Comparing annulus pressure to the same pressure some time ago to indicate if the pressure 
has changed 
Which failure mode can this indicator 
detect? 
Pressure buildup in the annulus and  
Small pressure drops in the annulus 
Is all required data available in excel: Yes, annulus pressure sensors signals are 
available. 
Is similar monitoring in place: No, only high pressure alarm for annulus in CCR. 
Sources of erroneous indication: Pressure changes caused by fluid expansion 
(temperature) can be indicated as leakage. 
Comment -  
Table 23: Development of the Annulus indicator. 
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Category: Choke 
Possible indicator 1  
Comparing ratio between choke position and flow measurement to ratio some time ago. 
Question Answer 
Which failure mode can this indicator 
detect? 
Mismatch between flow and reported position. 
Is all required data available in excel: Yes, both choke position and flow measurements 
from the multiphase flow meter is available  
Is similar monitoring in place: No 
Sources of erroneous indication: Can give erroneous indication of choke failure 
when other parameters affect the flow. 
Comment Only applicable for N-wells with multiphase 
flowmeter, i.e 5 out of 13 wells. 
Possible indicator 2 
Comparing ratio between choke position and pressure differential to ratio some time ago. 
Which failure mode can this indicator 
detect? 
Mismatch between flow and reported position. 
Is all required data available in excel: Yes, both choke position and pressure up and 
down stream of choke is available  
Is similar monitoring in place: No 
Sources of erroneous indication: Can give erroneous indication of choke failure 
when other parameters affect the flow. 
Comment Potentially challenging to develop a formula for 
ratio that does not indicate choke failure when the 
choke opening is changed. 
Possible indicator 3 
Flow coefficient of the choke. 
Which failure mode can this indicator 
detect? 
Abrasion of the choke valve interior. 
Is all required data available in excel No, only flow measurements for N-wells. 
Is similar monitoring in place: No 
Sources of erroneous indication: Few sources of error if the input data is good. 
Comment For an indicator based on sensor signals it is only 
applicable for N-wells with multiphase flowmeter, 
i.e 5 out of 13 wells 
Table 24: Development of the Choke indicator. 
 
